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Using a process-theoretic formalism, we introduce the notion of a causal-inferential theory: a triple
consisting of a theory of causal influences, a theory of inferences (of both the Boolean and Bayesian varieties),
and a specification of how these interact. Recasting the notions of operational and realist theories in this mold
clarifies what a realist account of an experiment offers beyond an operational account. It also yields a novel
characterization of the assumptions and implications of standard no-go theorems for realist representations
of operational quantum theory, namely, those based on Bell’s notion of locality and those based on generalized
noncontextuality. Moreover, our process-theoretic characterization of generalised noncontextuality is shown
to be implied by an even more natural principle which we term Leibnizianity. Most strikingly, our framework
offers a way forward in a research program that seeks to circumvent these no-go results. Specifically, we argue
that If one can identify axioms for a realist causal-inferential theory such that the notions of causation and
inference can differ from their conventional (classical) interpretations, then one has the means of defining an
intrinsically quantum notion of realism, and thereby a realist representation of operational quantum theory
that salvages the spirit of locality and of noncontextuality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key disagreements among quantum researchers
is the question of which elements of the quantum
formalism refer to ontological concepts and which refer to
epistemological concepts. The importance of settling this
issue was famously noted by E.T. Jaynes [1]:
[O]ur present [quantum mechanical] formalism
is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar
mixture describing in part realities of Nature,
in part incomplete human information about
Nature — all scrambled up by Heisenberg and
Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen
how to unscramble. Yet we think that the
unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further
advance in basic physical theory. For, if we
cannot separate the subjective and objective
aspects of the formalism, we cannot know what
we are talking about; it is just that simple.
The particular omelette of ontology and epistemology that
we will be endeavouring to unscramble in this work is the one
that results from the mixing up of the concepts of epistemic
inference on the one hand, and of causal influence on the
other.
Scrambling of this sort is not unique to the quantum
formalism—it arises also in the standard formalism for
classical statistics. In that context, Bayesian inference
concerns how learning one variable allows an agent to
update their information about another, while causal
influence concerns how controlling one variable allows an
agent to also have some control over another. Despite the
apparent clarity of the distinction, it is often challenging to
disentangle the two concepts. The statistical phenomena
known as ‘Simpson’s paradox’ [2] and ‘Berkson’s paradox’ [3],
for example, have the appearance of paradoxes precisely
because of our tendency to inappropriately slide from
statements about conditional probabilities (which merely
support inferences) to statements about cause-effect
relations. A satisfactory understanding of these phenomena
was only found after the development of the mathematical
framework of causal modeling [4, 5] that incorporated
certain formal distinctions between inference and influence
which are absent in the standard framework for statistical
reasoning.
The conceptual difficulty of disentangling influence and
inference is only compounded in the quantum realm, where
the interpretation of the elements of the mathematical
formalism is even less clear than it is in classical statistics.
The current article takes up this challenge more broadly,
by pursuing the unscrambling project for two mathematical
frameworks that have been used extensively in attempts to
understand the conceptual content of quantum theory. The
first is the framework of operational theories, which aims to
clarify what is distinctive about quantum theory by situating
it in a landscape of other possible theories, all characterized
in a minimalist way in terms of their operational predictions.
The second is the framework of realist theories (including
ontological models), which has been used to constrain
the possibilities for causal explanations of the operational
predictions of quantum theory (and other operational
theories).
We aim to recast both types of theory within a
new mathematical framework that incorporates a formal
distinction between inference and influence— a distinction
which is lacking in previous frameworks.
A theory in our framework is termed a causal-inferential
theory, and is constructed out of two components:
• a causal theory, which describes physical systems in
the world and the causal mechanisms that relate them,
and
3• an inferential theory, which describes an agent’s beliefs
about these systems and about the causal mechanisms
that relate them, as well as how such beliefs are
updated under the acquisition of new information.
The full causal-inferential theory is defined by the interplay
between these two components, and allows one to describe
a physical scenario in a manner which cleanly distinguishes
causal and inferential aspects.
Different causal-inferential theories can be obtained by
varying the causal theory, varying the inferential theory, or
varying both simultaneously. Note, however, that these two
components are required to interact in a particular manner,
so that the choice of one may be limited by the choice of
the other. In this work, we explore, in detail, two particular
choices of the causal theory and a single choice of inferential
theory, as we now outline.
We take the inferential theory to be Bayesian probability
theory combined with Boolean logic. Although we do not
explicitly construct any alternatives to this choice in this
article, we will have much to say about the possiblity of
nonclassical alternatives to this inferential theory. Given that
such a putative nonclassical inferential theory is the primary
contrast class for us, we will refer to the inferential theory
consisting of Bayesian probability theory and Boolean logic
as the classical theory of inference.
The two types of causal theory that we consider
correspond to operational and realist theories, respectively.
In the first type, systems are conceptualized as the causal
inputs and causal outputs of experimental procedures, and
the causal mechanisms holding between such systems are
simply descriptions of these experimental procedures. The
causal-inferential theories that one can construct from this
causal theory together with the classical inferential theory
are called operational causal-inferential theories, and can be
viewed as a refinement of the notion of operational theory
described in Ref. [6] and as a competitor to the framework of
Operational Probabilistic Theories [7].
In the second type of causal theory we consider, systems
are classical variables and the causal mechanisms holding
between these are functions. The (unique) causal-inferential
theory that we construct from this is termed a classical
realist causal-inferential theory and is a refinement of the
notion of a structural equation model in the field of causal
inference [5].1
In order to make a connection to other standard notions
of operational and realist theories, it is useful to introduce
a notion of inferential equialence. Two processes are said
to be inferentially equivalent if they lead one to make
the same inferences whatever scenario they might be
embedded within. If one quotients a causal-inferential
theory with respect to the congruence relation associated
1 Although such frameworks achieved significantly more unscrambling
of the causal-inferential omelette than the statistical frameworks
that preceded them—as noted above in our discussion of statistical
‘paradoxes’—our novel framework achieves some further unscrambling.
to inferential equivalence, one obtains a novel type of
theory, which we term a quotiented causal-inferential
theory. Importantly, the latter sort of theory blurs the
distinction between causation and inference, and hence
constitutes a partial rescrambling of the causal-inferential
omelette. Generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) [8–10],
we argue, are best understood as subtheories of quotiented
operational causal-inference theories 2 and consequently,
unlike unquotiented operational causal-inferential theories,
they necessarily involve some scrambling of causal and
inferential concepts. We also show that ontological
models [6], are best understood as subtheories of quotiented
classical realist causal-inferential theories, and hence are
also guilty of such scrambling.
Our framework leverages the mathematics of process
theories [11? , 12], which allows our framework to be
manifestly compositional, and consequently to apply to
operational or realist scenarios with arbitrarily complex
causal and inferential structure. Many previous frameworks
for operational theories [7, 10] have also availed themselves
of the mathematics of process theories to allow the
representation of arbitrarily complex structures. These did
not, however, explicitly distinguish the structures that are
causal and those that are inferential, as we do here. Our use
of the mathematics of process theories represents more of
an innovation on the realist side, since previous frameworks
for realist theories focused almost exclusively on the simple
structures that arise when describing prepare-measure
scenarios, sometimes with an intervening transformation
or sequence of transformations [13–18]. (These frameworks
also did not distinguish structures that are causal from those
that are inferential.)
One of the motivations for the standard framework
for ontological models was to answer the question of
whether the predictions of a given operational theory
admit of an explanation in terms of an underlying
ontology. The counterpart of this question in our new
framework is whether the predictions of a given operational
causal-inferential theory admit of an explanation in terms
of an underlying classical realist causal-inferential theory.
Such an explanation is deemed possible if the former can be
represented in terms of the latter. We refer to this as a classical
realist representation of an operational causal-inferential
theory.
The key constraint we impose on such representations
is that they preserve the causal and inferential structures
encoded in the diagrams, a property that is formalized by
demanding that the map between the two process theories
(operational and classical realist ) is diagram-preserving [19].
Because we take this structure to be common to the two
process theories, we show that this constraint involves no
loss of generality. Nonetheless, we show that, in concert
with standard hypotheses about the causal and inferential
2 This view of GPTs as quotiented operational causal-inferential theories is
closely related to the quotienting of operational probabilistic theories of
[7].
4structure, it acts as an umbrella principle which subsumes
many principles that have been used to derive no-go
theorems for classical realist representations of operational
quantum theory [19].
In particular, in the case of a Bell scenario, the assumption
of diagram preservation subsumes the causal and inferential
assumptions that go into deriving Bell inequalities (when
this derivation is conceptualized in terms of causal
modeling [20]). However, it is much more general than
this, and subsumes the causal and inferential assumptions
that go into deriving Bell-like inequalities (also known as
causal compatibility inequalities) for scenarios that have a
causal structure distinct from the Bell scenario [5, 20–24].
Our framework therefore also constitutes a refinement of
(or alternative to) recently proposed frameworks [5, 22]
for identifying causal compatibility constraints in such
scenarios.
We also demonstrate how a principle proposed by Leibniz
and used extensively by Einstein [25] can be generalized
in a natural way to apply to theories incorporating
epistemological claims in addition to ontological claims
and that this principle (or at least a consequence thereof)
can be formalized as a constraint on realist representations
of an operational causal-inferential theory that we term
Leibnizianity: the representation must preserve inferential
equivalences. We also demonstrate that the principle of
Leibnizianity implies a rehabilitated version of the principle
of generalized noncontextuality [6], such that no-go
theorems for generalized-noncontextual classical realist
representations of operational quantum theory (which can
be inferred from existing no-go theorems) imply no-go
theorems for Leibnizian classical realist representations,
while the question of whether the reverse implication
holds remains open. We also discuss the connections
between this principle and the old version of generalised
noncontextuality.
The counterparts, in our framework, of Bell’s theorem and
the no-go theorem for generalized noncontextuality can be
summarized respectively as follows. If quantum theory is
cast as an operational causal-inferential theory, then there
are distributions compatible with certain causal-inferential
structures that cannot be realized by a classical realist
causal-inferential theory with the same structure, and others
that can be so realized but not in a manner that preserves
inferential equivalences.
The conventional realist responses to the standard
no-go theorems are unsatisfactory in various ways, such
as requiring superluminal causal influences, requiring
fine-tuning, and running afoul of Leibniz’s principle. In
light of this, it has been suggested that a more satisfactory
way out of these no-go theorems may be achieved by
modifying the notion of a realist representation. This has
been described in past work as ‘going beyond the standard
ontological models framework’, but here is understood
as seeking a nonclassical generalization of the notion of
a classical realist representation. Our process-theoretic
framework provides the formal means of achieving this
because it allows the interpretation of causal and inferential
concepts to be determined by the axioms of the process
theories that describe them and hence to differ from the
conventional, classical interpretations of these concepts.
This is analogous to how, in nonEuclidean geometries, the
concepts of point and line acquire novel meanings distinct
from their conventional ones. Success in such a research
program consists in finding an intrinsically quantum notion
of a realist causal-inferential theory which can provide a
Leibnizian representation of operational quantum theory.
We propose natural constraints on the axioms describing a
theory of causal influences, a theory of epistemic inferences,
and their interactions. We also point to pre-existing work
that offers clues for how to proceed.
Thus, the work we present here provides a significant
step forward in this research program. On the one hand,
it provides, for the first time, a concrete proposal for the
mathematical form of the sought-after theory, and, on the
other hand, it provides a set of ideas for the form of its axioms,
thereby providing a road map for future research.
A. Process theories and diagram-preserving maps
We formalize the ideas discussed in the introduction
using the mathematical language of process theories and
diagram-preserving maps. This section serves as a brief
introduction to these concepts. Process theories provide
a mathematical framework for describing an extremely
broad class of theories, finding utility both in physics [12,
26] and beyond [27–29]. They can ultimately be given a
category-theoretic foundation, but in this paper we will
require only the diagrammatic approach.
As the name would suggest, the basic building blocks of
a process theory are processes. These could correspond to
physical processes in the world, but equally well could apply
to computational processes, mathematical processes, etc. In
our work, we will focus on causal and inferential processes.
Definition I.1 (Processes). A process is defined as a labeled
box with labeled input and output systems, e.g.:
u
A C C
A B
. (1)
The label of a system, e.g., A, is known as the type of the system
while the label on the box, e.g., u, is simply the name of the
process.
Note that it is allowed for a process to have no inputs
systems and/or no output systems. Processes with no inputs
are called states, those with no outputs are called effects, and
those with neither inputs nor outputs are called scalars. That
is,
s
A C
, e
ACC
, and *r * (2)
5are examples of a state, an effect and a scalar respectively.
Before we can define a process theory we must introduce
the idea of a diagram of processes.
Definition I.2 (Diagrams). A diagram is defined as a ‘wiring
together’ of a finite set of processes—that is, an output of one
process is connected to the input of another, such that the
system types match and no cycles are created. For example,
u
A
C
C
A
B
w
B
v
B . (3)
Only the connectivity of the diagram— which systems are
wired together and the ordering of the input and output
systems—is relevant. That is, two diagrams are the same
if one can be deformed into the other while preserving this
connectivity. For example,
g
f
≡
g
f
. (4)
We will now formally define what we mean by a process
theory.
Definition I.3 (Process theories). A process theory is defined
as a collection of processes, T, which is closed under forming
diagrams. For example, we can draw a box around the above
diagram and view it as another process in the theory. That is,
u
A
C
C
A
B
w
B
v
B
A
A
C
B
∈ T (5)
for u, v, w ∈ T.
This completes the definition of a process theory. However,
it is sometimes useful to introduce elementary notions from
which any diagram can be built up. To start, we highlight
certain elements of the diagrams by picking them out with
dashed boxes below:
u
A
C
C
A
A
w
B
v
B =: u
A
C
C
A
A
w
B
v
B*1*
1A
SB A
I
.
(6)
That is: i) one can view the empty box on the left as a special
scalar (as it has no input and no output) which we refer
to as the scalar 1; ii) one can view the box with the A wire
running through it as an identity process1A ; iii) one can view
the box with the crossed A and B wires as a swap process
SB A ; and iv) one can view the output system of v as the
trivial system I . Clearly our diagrammatic notation implies
constraints on these extra elements. In particular, wiring
identity processes onto any other process leaves that process
invariant; the composite of a trivial system with any other
system is just that system; swapping twice is the identity
on the two systems; and finally, composing a process with
the scalar 1 leaves that process invariant. Together with the
elements just introduced, one can introduce two elementary
notions of composition from which any diagram can be built
up: sequential composition of processes, denoted
g
B
C
◦ f
A
B
:=
g
B
C
A
f
, (7)
and parallel composition of processes, denoted
g
C
D
⊗ f
A
B
:= g
BD
A
f
C
. (8)
Note that, given any diagram, there are a (generally infinite)
number of ways in which it can be expressed in terms of
these primitive notions of composition, and yet these are
all the same diagram. Hence, we view the diagrammatic
representation as being the fundamental description, and
we view the elementary notions from which they can be built
as an (at times) convenient mathematical representation of
them.
6Remark I.4. Having defined these extra structures implicitly
in the diagrammatic notation, it should be clear how to
identify the structure of a process theory with that of a
strict symmetric monoidal category (SMC). In short, we take
processes to be morphisms and systems to be objects, with
sequential and parallel composition providing morphism
composition and the monoidal product, respectively.
We will often consider higher-order processes such as
τ
A
B
A′
B ′
, (9)
which we will call clamps. These can be thought of as objects
which map a process from A to B to a process from A′ to B ′
via
T
A
B
7→ τ
A
B
A′
B ′
T . (10)
These are not primitive notions within the framework of
process theories, but rather are constructed out of two
processes xτ and yτ connected together with an auxiliary
system Wτ, as
τ
A
B
A′
B ′
=
A
B
xτ
yτ
Wτ
A′
B ′
. (11)
We will consider a number of different process theories,
some of which are sub-process-theories of others.
Definition I.5. A sub-process-theory T ⊆ T ′ is a process
theory where the processes are a subset of the processes in
T ′ and composition of processes in T is given by composition
in T ′. Note that since a sub-process-theory is a process theory,
T must be closed under composition.
Remark I.6. In terms of the associated SMCs, this is simply
defining T as a subSMC of T ′.
As well as these process theories and sub-process-theories,
we will also consider structure-preserving maps between
these. The relevant structure which we demand be preserved
is the composition of processes as described by diagrams.
Definition I.7 (diagram-preserving maps). A
diagram-preserving map, m : T→ T′ , is a map from
processes in T to processes in T′ such that wiring together
processes in T to form a diagram and then applying the
map m is the same as applying m to each of the component
processes and then wiring them together in T′. We depict
these maps as shaded boxes, e.g.
u
v
w
m
A
D
B
B
C
A
mA
mAmB
, (12)
where the diagram in the green box is a diagram in T (with
input A and outputs B and A) which is mapped by the green
box m to a process in T′ with input mA and outputs mA and
mB . In this example, the constraint of diagram preservation
is simply that
u
v
w
m
A
D
B
B
C
A
mA
mAmB
= u
v
w
m
m
m
mB
mA
mB
mA
mD
mC
. (13)
Remark I.8. If one views each process theory as an SMC, then
such diagram-preserving maps are simply strict symmetric
monoidal functors between the SMCs.
It will also be useful to consider partial DP maps where the
domain is limited in scope.
Definition I.9 (Partial diagram-preserving maps). A
partial diagram-preserving map m : T′→ T′′ is a
diagram-preserving map from some sub-process-theory
T ⊆ T′ to T′′.
Remark I.10. Categorically, such a map is a partial strict
symmetric monoidal functor between the relevant SMCs.
Remark I.11 (Category of process theories,
PROCESSTHEORY). The category of process theories is
defined as follows: The objects of PROCESSTHEORY are process
theories and the morphisms are diagram-preserving maps.
It is simple to see that this is indeed a category as one can
easily define identity morphisms and morphism composition
satisfying the relevant conditions. Moreover, if one views the
process theories themselves as being SMCs, then this can be
thought of as the 2-category SYMMMONCAT.
7II. CAUSAL PRIMITIVES
The primitive causal notions in our framework are
systems and the causal mechanisms that relate them.
Systems correspond to physical degrees of freedom in the
conventional sense of being the loci of causal relations,
i.e., the causal relata. Causal mechanisms are autonomous
physical relationships between these systems, relationships
governed by the laws of nature and by the arrangement of
relevant physical systems and apparatuses.
In classical theories, systems are often represented by
sets, and causal mechanisms by functions between these
(e.g., in structural equation models [5]). In quantum theory,
systems are typically represented by Hilbert spaces, and
causal mechanisms by unitaries between these [30]3. In
operational causal-inferential (CI) theories, one typically
does not have a direct description of the causal mechanisms,
but rather only a very coarse-grained description of them in
terms of laboratory procedures that are implemented on the
relevant systems; these systems are represented only as an
abstract label, and typically represent the physical systems
one imagines are input and output from the apparatuses.
In the next two sections, we will consider two distinct
classes of causal primitives in more detail, first those relevant
for operational CI theories, and then those relevant for
classical realist CI theories.
A. Process theories of laboratory procedures
We now define the process theory which will ultimately
constitute the causal component of an operational CI
theory. We denote it PROC (as shorthand for ‘procedure’ not
‘process’). The systems in PROC label the primitive causal
relata, while the processes, which describe the potential
causal relations between them, are labeled by laboratory
procedures, conceptualised as a list of instructions of what
to do in the lab, and presumed to be individuated by the
system they act on (the input system) and the system they
prepare (the output system).
We will label general systems by A, B, etc. Some systems
(which could, for instance, represent setting or outcome
variables) will be deemed classical. A classical system X
will be associated with a set X which represents the set of
distinct states of the classical system. Diagrammatically,
a general laboratory procedure t with input system A and
output system B will be drawn as
t
A
B
. (14)
3 Although how to decompose a given unitary with multiple outputs and a
given internal causal structure remains an open problem [30, 31].
We define a measurement m on system A as a process with a
generic input system A and a classical output system X:
m
A
X
. (15)
Classical systems in PROC will be drawn with a light grey
wire, as was done in this diagram. We denote the set of
operations with input systemA and output system B as AB .
The set of measurements on a system A having outcome
space X is therefore denoted AX. Classical systems allow
one to describe more than just measurement outcomes; for
instance, they can also represent classical control systems.
One can compose these operations to describe
experiments. For example, a preparation procedure
on system A followed by a measurement on A with outcome
space X is described by the diagram
m
p
A
X
, (16)
while controlling a transformation from B to C on the output
X of a measurement on A would be described by the diagram
B
C
c
m
X
A
. (17)
An example of a more general diagram is
q
Y
X
C
A
B
r
X
t
B
D
. (18)
In our formalism, such a diagram represents a hypothesis
about the fundamental causal structure. In Appendix B
we discuss the consequences of this choice and how
it differs from the choice typically made in operational
frameworks. Here, two wires in parallel should be interpreted
as independent subsystems (e.g. independent degrees of
freedom), where one can talk independently about either
subsystem as a potential causal influence on other systems.
Note that this does not uniquely define a process theory,
as we have not uniquely specified the set of systems or
8procedures; hence, we can consider different procedural
theories PROC, PROC′, ..., and each will be part of a different
operational CI theory.
Remark II.1. Unlike the other process theories that we deal
with in this paper, PROC is a free process theory. This means
that there are no equalities other than those defined by the
framework of process theories—two diagrams are equal if and
only if they can be transformed into one another by sliding the
processes around on the page while preserving the wiring.
B. Process theory of classical functional dynamics
We now define the process theory which will ultimately act
as the causal component of our notion of a classical realist
causal-inferential theory. We denote it FUNC.
The systems in FUNC again label the primitive causal
relata. However, what distinguishes them from the systems
in PROC is that we assume that these relata are described by
ontic state spaces, that is, some finite4 sets Λ,Λ′, .... The
processes in FUNC are functions f : Λ → Λ′ describing
dynamics on these ontic state spaces.5
Diagrammatically, a function f with input Λ and output
Λ′ will be drawn as
f
Λ
Λ′
. (19)
We denote the set of functions with input Λ and output Λ′
as ΛΛ′ . We take the trivial system to be the singleton set?=
{∗}. Hence, states correspond to functions s :?→Λ which
are in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of Λ;
there is a unique effect u :Λ→? for each system, defined by
u(λ)=∗ for all λ ∈Λ; and, there is a unique scalar 1 :?→?
corresponding to the identity function on the singleton set.
We can compose these functions to describe ontological
scenarios. A function which prepares some ontic state of
system Λ followed by a function describing the functional
dynamics of the system is described by the diagram
m
g
Λ
Λ′
, (20)
while some more general ontological scenario could be
4 This assumption of finiteness is made for simplicity of presentation, but
could be removed in future work.
5 Note that we will allow arbitrary functions in this work, although in some
cases one might wish to restrict the dynamics, e.g., to reversible functions
or to symplectomorphisms.
described by the diagram
f
Λ′′
Λ′′′
Λ′′
Λ′
Λ
g
Λ′′′
h
Λ
Λ′
. (21)
The key formal distinction between FUNC and PROC is that
FUNC is not a free process theory. Indeed, there are many
nontrivial equalities provided by composition of functions.
An example is provided by Eq. (20), the diagram, which is
made up of two functions g :?→Λ and m :Λ→Λ′, is strictly
equal to the diagram
h
Λ′
, (22)
where h is the sequential composition of m and g , i.e., h :
?→Λ′ ::∗→m(g (∗)).
Composite systems are given by the Cartesian product of
the associated sets:
Λ Λ′
:=
Λ×Λ′ . (23)
Parallel composition is given by the Cartesian product of
functions,
f
Λ1
Λ′1
g
Λ2
Λ′2
:= f × g
Λ1×Λ2
Λ′1×Λ′2
, (24)
and sequential composition is given by composition of
functions,
f
Λ
Λ′
g
Λ′′
:= g ◦ f
Λ
Λ′′
. (25)
It follows that any diagram is equal to the function from its
inputs to its outputs, and that one can compute this effective
function directly from the specific functions which comprise
the diagram.
Remark II.2. Categorically we are simply defining the
symmetric monoidal category FINSET whose objects are finite
sets, morphisms are all functions between them, and the
monoidal structure is given by the cartesian product and the
singleton set.
9III. INFERENTIAL PRIMITIVES
We now formalize, as a process theory, the classical theory
of inference, which describes an agent’s states of knowledge,
the propositions they are interested in, and the inferences
that they should make if they are to be rational. We term
this the inferential process theory, and denote it INF. To
diagrammatically distinguish the causal structure encoded in
PROC or FUNC from the inferential structure encoded in INF,
we will draw processes in the two causal theories vertically
and processes in the inferential theory horizontally. We will
term the systems in the former causal systems, and systems
in the latter inferential systems.
INF itself is composed of two process theories, BAYES
and BOOLE, which encode Bayesian probability theory and
Boolean propositional logic, respectively.
A. Bayesian probability theory
The first component of INF is (classical) Bayesian
probability theory, describing an agent’s states of knowledge
and the updating thereof. We denote this process theory
BAYES.
Systems in BAYES are represented by finite sets labeled by
X ,Y , . . . . A process from X to Y in this theory is interpreted
as the propagation of an agent’s knowledge about X to her
knowledge about Y , and is represented by a stochastic map.
Such a process will be depicted diagrammatically as
s
YX . (26)
The trivial system is the singleton set, ? := {∗}, and a map q
from the trivial system to system X , depicted as
σ
X , (27)
corresponds to a probability distribution over X . We will
denote the point distribution δX ,x on some element x ∈ X
as [x]. There is a unique effect for each system which
corresponds to marginalisation over the variable. This is
drawn as
X . (28)
As this is the unique effect, it is clear that any closed diagram
is associated with the number 1, which is the unique scalar
in BAYES. It follows that given a state of knowledge σ about
a pair of variables, X and Y , one can define the marginal
distribution on the variable X as
σ
Y
X . (29)
Note that it is possible to take convex combinations
of stochastic processes provided that they have matching
system types. We denote a convex combination of stochastic
processes {si : X → Y } with weights {pi } as
∑
i
pi si
YX = s YX , (30)
where s : X → Y is another stochastic process in the theory,
namely, s =∑i pi si .
Remark III.1. Categorically, BAYES is simply the symmetric
monoidal category FINSTOCH where objects are finite sets and
morphisms are stochastic maps between them.
B. Boolean propositional logic
The second component of INF is the description
of propositions, as governed by (classical) Boolean
propositional logic. We denote the process theory describing
this as BOOLE. The systems in BOOLE are finite sets labeled
by X ,Y , ..., just as in BAYES. However, the processes in BOOLE
are partial functions; that is, functions that may only be
defined on a subset of their domain.
Many of the key processes in BOOLE are simply functions;
we introduce these first, and only later discuss the more
general processes in BOOLE for which partial functions are
required.
First, we consider states in BOOLE: functions from the
trivial system ? to a generic system X . These are in
one-to-one correspondence with the elements of X , and
so we can simply label each function by the element x
which is the image of ∗ under it. Hence, we can write
x :?→ X ::∗ 7→ x, depicted diagrammatically as
x
X . (31)
We will refer to states in BOOLE as value assignments,
because they can naturally be viewed as assigning a value x
to the variable ranging over the set X .
Yes-no questions about a system X can be represented
as functions from X to the answer set B := {Y, N}, we refer to
this answer set B as the Boolean system. Diagrammatically,
these yes-no questions are denoted by
pi
X B . (32)
A value assignment x ∈ X assigns the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
such questions via composition:
pix
X B ∈
{
Y
B , N B
}
. (33)
Now, each of these yes-no questions can be uniquely
characterized by the subset of X for which the answer is
‘yes’, that is, {x ∈ X s.t. pi :: x 7→ Y}. This means that they
are in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the
powerset of X which we will view as a Boolean algebra,
and, hence which we will denote by B(X ). Due to this
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correspondence, we will use the symbol pi both to denote
the function pi : X → B and the element of the Boolean
algebra pi ∈B(X ). We therefore refer to such functions as
propositional questions6.
We now show how the structure of the Boolean
algebra B(X ) can be diagrammatically represented using
such propositional questions. To begin, there are two
distinguished propositions in the Boolean algebra, the
tautological proposition > (corresponding to the subset
X ⊆ X ) and the contradictory proposition⊥ (corresponding
to the empty subset;⊆ X ). As propositional questions these
can be defined diagrammatically via
∀x ∈ X >x X B = Y B (34)
∀x ∈ X ⊥x X B = N B . (35)
Moreover, our representation of propositions as functions
in BOOLE allows us to diagrammatically represent unary and
binary logical operations on the propositions, by defining
them in terms of their action on Boolean systems. For
example, the NOT operation on an arbitrary proposition can
be represented as
¬piX B = pi ¬X B B , (36)
where the dot decorated by the ¬ symbol is the function
¬ : B → B whose action on the Boolean system reflects the
truth table of the logical NOT, namely ¬(Y)= N and ¬(N)= Y
(implying that ¬ is self-inverse). Similarly, one can represent
the logical OR operation (disjunction), denoted ∨, as
pi∨pi′X B =
pi′X B
pi
BX
∨ BX , (37)
where the black dot is the copy function • : X → X×X defined
by •(x) = (x, x), and the dot decorated by the ∨ symbol is
the function ∨ : B × B → B whose action on the Boolean
system reflects the truth table of the logical OR, namely
Y∨ Y = Y∨N = N∨ Y = Y and N∨N = N. In a similar manner,
one can construct representations of the logical AND, logical
implication, exclusive OR, etc.
We have therefore diagrammatically represented the
basic operations required to define a Boolean algebra
B(X ). Moreover, the basic properties of a Boolean
algebra (associativity, absorption, commutativity, identity,
annihilation, idempotence, complements, and distributivity)
can also be shown to hold. These are defined and proven in
Appendix C 1.
One can also express propositional questions about
composite systems, for example
X
B
Y
pi , (38)
6 These could also have been termed ‘predicates’.
where pi ∈B(X ×Y ). We discuss in Appendix C 3 how these
can be constructed out of single-system propositions.
Arbitrary functions are also valid processes in BOOLE,
since (as we now show) each is a valid Boolean algebra
homomorphism, that is, a map between Boolean algebras
that preserves the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ as well as
the top and bottom elements > and ⊥. Consider a general
function
f
X Y . (39)
In the process theory BAYES, this process would be viewed
as a stochastic map acting on the right to take states of
knowledge about X to states of knowledge about Y . Within
BOOLE, however, this process is viewed as a map acting
on the left, taking a propositional question about Y to a
propositional question about X via
f pi
X Y B =: f (pi)X B . (40)
We now show that f (_) defines a Boolean Algebra
homomorphism from B(Y ) to B(X ), where each subset
of Y is mapped to the subset of X which is the preimage
under f (_) of the subset of Y . We will sometimes refer to
such generic functions simply as propositional maps. It is
easy to see that propositional maps do indeed preserve ∧,
∨, >, and ⊥. The fact that the propositional map > : Y →
B :: y 7→ Y is preserved follows immediately from the fact
that f (_) maps every x to some y , which> then necessarily
maps to Y. Preservation of ⊥ is analogous. To see that ∧ is
preserved—namely, that f (pi∧pi′)= f (pi)∧ f (pi′)—note that
f (pi∧pi′)X B = pi∧pi′f B (41)
=
pi′
pi
∧ Bf (42)
=
pi′f
pif
∧ B (43)
=
f (pi′)
f (pi)
∧ B (44)
= f (pi)∧ f (pi′)X B , (45)
where the equality between Eq. (42) and Eq. (43) simply
states that copying the output of a function is the same
as copying the input and applying the function to the two
copies of the input. The proof of preservation of ∨ is
analogous.
Remark III.2. Categorically, this dual picture of f (_)
as a function from X to Y and as a Boolean Algebra
homomorphism fromB(Y ) toB(X ) is the duality between
the categories FINSET and FINBOOLALG where B = {Y, N} is
the dualising object.
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To express the truth value assigned to a proposition, we
must introduce scalars and effects, which moreover requires
us to go beyond functions and consider partial functions7. A
partial function fˆ : X → Y is a function from some (possibly
empty) subset χ fˆ ⊆ X to Y ; the partial function is simply
undefined on the elements of X outside of this subset.
There are two scalars in BOOLE, which we identify with
true and false; namely, the function True : ?→ ? :: ∗ 7→ ∗
and the partial function False :?→?, which is defined only
on the empty set ;, that is, χFalse = ;. The scalar True is
depicted by the empty diagram, since composing it with any
other process leaves that process invariant:
f
X Y
True
= fX Y . (46)
The scalar False behaves as a ‘zero scalar’, in the following
sense. Defining the ‘zero process’ for a pair of systems (X ,Y )
as the unique partial function 0 : X → Y such that χ0 =;, it
follows that composing any other partial function fˆ : X → Y
with False will give this zero process:
fˆ
X Y
False
= 0X Y . (47)
Now, effects within BOOLE are partial functions taking
X →?, diagrammatically denoted by
pi
X . (48)
We will see that these are also in one-to-one correspondence
with the elements of the Boolean algebra B(X ), which
justifies our labelling them by propositions pi. To see this,
first note that value assignments x ∈ X assign a truth-value to
effects within BOOLE when the two are composed together:
pi
X
x ∈
{
True , False
}
. (49)
Hence, one can uniquely associate a partial function with
the subset of X for which we obtain True; indeed, this subset
is the domain χpi of the effect, viewed as a partial function.
We will call such partial functions propositional effects.
At this point, we have three uses of the symbol pi: we have
pi ∈B(X ) as a subset (an element of a Boolean Algebra), pi :
X → B as a propositional question, and now pi : X →? as a
propositional effect. The distinction between these should
be clear from context.
7 This is because in the process theory of functions, there is a unique scalar
and a unique effect. The unique scalar is the function taking the singleton
set to itself, while the unique effect is the function from X to the singleton
set which maps every element x ∈ X to ∗.
To more explicitly see the connections between
propositional effects and propositional questions, let
us consider the special case of propositional effects for the
Boolean system B. There are four of these, corresponding to
the four subsets of B on which the partial function from B to
? can be defined, namely {Y}, {N}, {Y, N}, and ;.
We denote these effects, respectively, as
Y
B , NB , >B , and ⊥B . (50)
Then, we can write a given propositional effect in terms of
the associated propositional question via
pi
X = YBpiX . (51)
Value assignments to propositional effects are then
consistent with value assignment to propositional questions,
in the sense that
pi
X
x = True ⇐⇒ pix X B = Y B . (52)
It turns out that all partial functions can be generated
from the elements we have introduced so far, and hence all
of these are in BOOLE. An arbitrary partial function fˆ can be
written as
χ fˆ
Y
F
X , (53)
where χ fˆ is an arbitrary propositional effect, F : X → Y is
an arbitrary propositional map, and the black dot is the
copy function. Here, the top part of the diagram defines
the subset of the domain on which the partial function is
defined, and then F defines the action of the partial function
on that domain. Hence, we have that
Remark III.3. Categorically, the process theory BOOLE is the
symmetric monoidal category FINSETPART where objects are
finite sets and morphisms are partial functions.
We discussed how the functions in BOOLE correspond
to Boolean algebra homomorphisms. In contrast, partial
functions in BOOLE are more general. In general,
partial functions do not map propositional questions to
propositional questions (via Eq. (40)), but rather take them
to other partial functions. However, partial functions do map
propositional effects to propositional effects via
pi
Y
fˆ
X =: fˆ (pi)X , (54)
and so we can ask which structures of the Boolean algebra of
propositional effects are preserved by such a map. We show
in Appendix C 2 that ⊥, ∨ and ∧ are preserved, but > and
¬ are not. We then show that a partial function from X to
Y corresponds to a Boolean Algebra homomorphism from
B(Y ) toB(χ fˆ ).
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C. The full inferential process theory
We now show how the probabilistic and the propositional
parts of the inferential theory interact—for example, allowing
one to compute the probability one should assign to a
propositional effect on a system X , given an arbitrary state
of knowledge about X . This interaction is possible because
BAYES and BOOLE define a collection of processes on the
same types of systems. However, the processes in BAYES are
stochastic maps, while those in BOOLE are partial functions,
and so it remains to define how these interact with one
another.
We proceed by showing that both BAYES and BOOLE can be
faithfully represented within the process theory of real linear
maps, and defining INF as the process theory generated by
arbitrary composition of processes from either of these. That
is, there is a diagram-preserving inclusion map from BAYES
into INF, and there is a diagram-preserving map (given by
Eq. (57) below) from BOOLE into INF. Hence, we have
BAYES INF BOOLE. (55)
First, let us consider BOOLE. Note that any function f :
X → Y can be represented by an associated stochastic map,
(fyx )
y∈Y
x∈X , via:
fyx =
{
1 if f (x)= y
0 otherwise.
(56)
This stochastic map is deterministic, in that there is precisely
a single 1 in each column, with the rest of the elements are 0.
It is not difficult to check that these stochastic maps compose
in the same way as the underlying functions, and so this gives
us a representation of the process theory of functions within
the process theory of stochastic maps.
More generally, a partial function fˆ is also associated with
a stochastic map via
fˆyx =
{
1 if fˆ (x)= y
0 otherwise,
(57)
with the only difference being that for functions, the 0 case
occurs only when f (x) 6= y , whereas for partial functions
it will also occur when fˆ is not defined on x. These
are more general than deterministic stochastic maps in
that some of the 1s may be replaced by 0s—that is, they
are substochastic maps. Again, one can check that the
representative substochastic maps compose in the same way
as the underlying partial functions.
Clearly, the probabilistic part of the theory, which is
described by stochastic maps, can also be represented as
substochastic maps, as the former are simply a special case
of the latter.
Hence, both BAYES and BOOLE can be represented within
SUBSTOCH.
Within this representation, certain processes in BAYES
and certain processes in BOOLE correspond to the same
substochastic map, and hence are identified. For example,
we have the identification
>X = X , (58)
since both are represented by the all-ones column vector.
As another simple example, the representation of any
function in the propositional theory will coincide with
some deterministic stochastic map in BAYES; hence, such
processes in INF can be viewed either acting on the left as
propositional maps, or acting on the right as stochastic maps.
As a final example, the representation of a delta function
probability distribution [x] from BAYES coincides with the
representation of the value assignment asserting X = x from
BOOLE.
Consider now the representation of the scalars in BAYES
and BOOLE. The unique scalar 1 in BAYES remains the same
in this representation, while the pair of scalars in BOOLE,
namely True and False, are represented respectively by the
scalars 1 and 0 within SUBSTOCH.
These two representations interact in the obvious way. For
example, we expect the diagram
σ pi
X (59)
to give the probability Prob(pi||σ) that the proposition pi
about X is true, given a state of knowledgeσ about X . Indeed,
this can be computed within the theory of substochastic
maps:
Y
B
piσ
X = ∑
x∈X
σ(x) YBpi[x]
X (60)
= ∑
x∈X
σ(x)δpi(x),Y (61)
= ∑
x∈pi
σ(x) (62)
=Prob(pi :σ). (63)
It turns out that arbitrary substochastic maps can be realized
by the interaction of stochastic maps and partial functions.
An arbitrary substochastic map can be represented as
Y
B
w
Y
s
X
, (64)
where s and w are arbitrary stochastic maps. Here,
w specifies the normalization of each column of the
substochastic map, while s specifies the action of each
column (apart from the normalization factor). Hence, we
have that
Remark III.4. Categorically, INF is the symmetric monoidal
category FINSUBSTOCH where objects are finite sets and
morphisms are substochastic maps between them, together
with a selected subobject classifier {Y, N}. It is, however, useful
to see how this structure arises from the interaction between
the probabilistic part (as described by FINSTOCH) and the
propositional part (as described by FINSETPART).
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Remark III.5. Strictly speaking, in what follows, we will
have certain inferential systems labeled by sets of infinite
cardinality. Recalling that PROC is a free process theory,
its hom-set will typically be of infinite cardinality. (In
contrast, note that the hom-sets in FUNC are finite, so
the issue will not arise there). To formally deal with
this, rather than working with FINSUBSTOCH, we should
work with SUBSTOCH—defined as the Kleisli category of
the subdistribution monad on SET.8 In this process theory,
states are subnormalised probability distributions with finite
support, and general processes are substochastic maps which
do not generate distributions with infinite support. In future
work, it will be important to consider more sophisticated
measure-theoretic approaches to infinite sets—in particular,
to allow for ontic state spaces of infinite cardinality.
IV. CAUSAL-INFERENTIAL THEORIES
Having introduced the causal and inferential primitives,
we can now discuss how they interact to define a
causal-inferential theory. We will briefly describe the
construction in general, and then go into detail on the
two sorts of causal-inferential theories we consider in
this pair, namely, the causal-inferential theory of lab
procedures, which we term ‘operational CI theories’, and the
causal-inferential theory of functional dynamics, which we
term ‘classical realist CI theories’, or simply realist CI theories
for short.
A causal-inferential theory consists of a triple of process
theories and a triple of diagram preserving (partial) maps
CAUS C-I INF
p
e i , (65)
where the primary theory C-I is constructed via
diagram-preserving maps out of a causal primitive
CAUS (which in this paper will be taken to be PROC or FUNC)
and an inferential theory (taken in this paper to be INF).
The map i simply denotes that INF is included in C-I as a
subprocess theory, while the map e takes each process in
CAUS to a state of knowledge in C-I specifying that one is
certain that the given process occurred. It also includes all
of the causal systems from CAUS in C-I. We then define how
the causal and inferential systems interact, by introducing
some generators of this interaction which are subject to a
collection of rewrite rules. The three basic generators allow
one to(i) specify a state of knowledge about a particular
causal transformation, (ii) gain information from a classical
causal system, and (iii) ignore causal systems. Finally, the
partial map p allows one to make probabilistic predictions,
given one’s knowledge about a particular causal scenario.
We will for simplicity sometimes refer to the full
causal-inferential theory simply as C-I, but this should be
8 Thanks are due to Martti Karvonen for recognizing this issue, giving the
resolution to it, and then explaining the resolution to us.
understood from context to be shorthand for the triple in
Eq. (65) (including, in particular, the prediction map).
A. Operational causal-inferential theories
We will us the term ‘operational causal-inferential (CI)
theory’ to refer to a causal-inferential theory of lab
procedures; that is, taking CAUS= PROC in eq. 65, i.e.,
PROC P-I INF
p
e i . (66)
We have already defined PROC and INF, but it remains
to explicitly define P-I and the diagram-preserving maps
between these.
INF is a subprocess theory of P-I, explicitly represented
by the inclusion of INF into P-I via a DP map i : INF→ P-I .
Diagrammatically, we denote this as a green map, e.g.
s
YX
i
. (67)
That is, i denotes that some process in P-I is a member of the
subprocess theory INF. For example, in the equation
s
YX = s YX
i
, (68)
the process s on the RHS is a process in INF, shown being
mapped by i to the process s in P-I, shown on the LHS. In this
case, s as a process in P-I (on the LHS) is in the image under i
of a process s in INF (on the RHS).
However, PROC is not a sub-process-theory of P-I; that
is, the DP map e : PROC→ P-I is a more complicated
embedding. All of the systems from PROC are directly
included as systems within P-I. In order to fully define
the embedding map e, we must define how the causal and
inferential systems in P-I interact.
To proceed, we introduce some fundamental
generators—interactions between causal and inferential
systems. The first generator allows us to specify our state of
knowledge about which procedure occurs. There is one such
generator for each pair (A,B) of systems, depicted as
AB
A
B
. (69)
We then interpret
A
B
σ
AB (70)
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as describing that we have state of knowledge σ about the
transformation procedure taking A to B. Indeed, σ is here a
probability distribution over the set AB of transformation
procedures. We will denote the delta function state of
knowledge on t ∈ PROC by [t ], so that
A
B
[t ]
AB (71)
represents certainty that A transforms into B via the
procedure t .
Now, suppose that we have states of knowledge about
each of two transformation procedures where the output of
one is the only input of the other (so that they are purely
cause-effect related), then there is a stochastic map which
represents how to update knowledge about each of the
two individual transformations to a state of knowledge of
the composite transformation procedure. We denote this
stochastic map as
AB
BC
AC , (72)
defined by linearity and its action on delta-function states of
knowledge, namely
∀t , t ′
AB
BC
AC
[t ]
[t ′]
= AC*****[t ′ ◦ t ] (73)
where ◦ denotes sequential composition in PROC. To
reproduce the intuitive notion of composition, we demand
that
A
B
AB
BC C
=
AB
BC
AC
C
A
. (74)
This rewrite rule can be understood as the equality of two
different methods of specifying one’s knowledge that the
causal structure is a chain A → B →C . The fact that B is a
complete causal mediary betweenA andC can be encoded in
the causal structure of a diagram (as on the LHS), but the RHS
encodes it in the inferential structure, as a state of knowledge
about the transformation from A to C that is specified in
terms of one’s state of knowledge about a transformation
from A to B and about a transformation from B to C.
Similarly, we can define a stochastic map which
represents how one combines states of knowledge about
transformations that are causally disconnected. Specifically,
suppose that in a transformation from AC to BD, B is
influenced only by A and D is influenced only by C. The
relevant stochastic map,
CD
AB
ACBD , (75)
can be defined by linearity and its action on delta-function
states of knowledge, namely
∀t , t ′
CD
AB
ACBD
[t ′]
[t ]
= ACBD*****[t ⊗ t ′] , (76)
where⊗denotes the parallel composition of processes within
PROC. Then, in analogy to Eq. (74), we demand that
A
B
AB
CD
C
D
=
CD
AB
ACBD
A C
B D
. (77)
Finally, it will often be useful to be able to interpret some
bits of wiring as themselves being processes in P-I, namely,
the identity procedure 1 and swap procedure S respectively.
We therefore impose that
[1] = (78)
[S] = . (79)
Essentially, these constraints allow us to lift the
compositional, that is, causal, structure of PROC into
our theory of states of knowledge about PROC, that is,
into P-I. In particular, given the basic generators and
constraints we have just introduced, one can construct a
DP map e : PROC→ P-I which embeds procedures into P-I
as delta-function states of knowledge:
t
A
B
e
:=
A
B
[t ]
AB . (80)
It is simple to check that our constraints on this generator
imply that this map is indeed diagram-preserving. For
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example,
t′
t
A
B
C
e
= t′ ◦ t
A
C
e
(81)
=
A
C
[t ′ ◦ t ] AC (82)
=
AB
BC
AC
C
A
[t ′]
[t ]
(83)
=
A
B
AB
BC C
[t ′]
[t ]
(84)
=
t′
t
A
B
C
B
e
e
. (85)
The second generator allows us to directly gain knowledge
from a classical causal system. There is one such generator
for each classical system X:
X
X
X
. (86)
This can equivalently be interpreted as a generator which
allows us to ask a question about a classical system by
attaching a proposition to it. For example, a proposition
pi about the outcome of a measurement m is depicted as
pi
[m]
. (87)
Note that there is no such generator for systems that are
not classical, since for these, there is no way to directly gain
information about the system; rather, one can only probe
them indirectly via their interaction with classical systems.
As with the previous generator, this generator must satisfy
certain constraints. First, it must satisfy
= . (88)
That is, if the propositional effect we consider for a causal
system is the tautological one, which corresponds to
marginalisation, the causal system is left invariant.
Additionally, under sequential composition we demand
=
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
, (89)
where • is the stochastic broadcasting map which can be
defined by linearity and its action on delta-function states of
knowledge, namely,
X
X
[x]
X :=
X
X
[x]
[x]
. (90)
Eq. (89) states that directly gaining knowledge about the
same system twice is the same as copying the knowledge
gained from the system.
We also have a constraint for parallel composition:
=
X
X
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
X
X ×Y
Y
Y
X
X
, (91)
where is really just the identity stochastic map, but where
one is changing from diagrammatically denoting a pair of
systems as a single wire to denoting them by a pair of wires.
Similarly, we have , which merges a pair of wires into a
single wire:
Y
X
X ×Y . (92)
Finally, we introduce our last generator, which represents
the ignoring of a causal system as
A . (93)
We depict the process of ignoring a system by the same
symbol (albeit smaller) as marginalisation in the inferential
theory to make clear that this is not a physical discarding
process (such as physically annihilating a system somehow).
It merely represents the fact that one is no longer interested
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in this system. That is, this ignoring process is applied
whenever an agent decides that they will consider no further
propositions about a system or its causal descendents.
The ignoring process satisfies the constraint
AB
=
A B
, (94)
stating that ignoring a composite system is the same as
ignoring each of its components. Moreover, it has a nontrivial
interaction with the generator of Eq. (69), as we demand that
B
A
AB =
A
AB . (95)
That is, if one is not going to ask any propositional
questions about B, then one can ignore the identity of the
transformation from A to B, as well as A itself. We term this
the constraint of ignorability.
We will assume that the ignoring process for the trivial
system, I, is simply given by the empty diagram and hence
we obtain two special cases of Eq. (95):
A
AI =
A
AI =
A
AI I =
A
AI (96)
and
BIB = IB
I
= IB = IB . (97)
Due to its compositional nature, this framework is
clearly able to express scenarios far more general than
the well-studied prepare-measure scenario. Even within
a simple prepare-measure scenario, our framework allows
us to express generality that is typically neglected. In
a prepare-measure scenario, the conventional states of
knowledge one has and propositions one considers (i.e., the
conventional inferential structure) are represented in our
framework by
A
σ
pi
X
τ
, (98)
where σ is a state of knowledge about the preparation of A,
τ is a state of knowledge about the measurement on A, and
pi is a proposition about the measurement outcome X. One
can change the inferential structure of the scenario without
changing the causal structure of the scenario, e.g., to
A
σ pi
X
τ
, (99)
where σ is a joint state of knowledge about the preparation
and measurement procedures, τ is a state of knowledge
about some auxiliary inferential system, and pi is a
joint proposition about which laboratory procedures were
performed, the outcome of the measurement, and the
auxiliary inferential system. This extra generality is useful,
e.g., in cases where one knows that the preparation and
measurement devices are aligned with each other, but not
how they are aligned with respect to the lab’s reference frame.
It will be helpful to introduce a notation which represents
a generic diagram in P-I while not displaying all the internal
structure—that is, how the diagram is built up out of the
generators—but rather only shows its open inputs and
outputs. We draw such a generic diagram as
D . (100)
In a process theory, diagrams without any inputs and outputs
are termed closed diagrams. Analogously, diagrams whose
only inputs and outputs are inferential will be termed
causally closed diagrams and diagrams whose only inputs
and outputs are causal will be termed inferentially closed
diagrams.
At this point, we can make a useful observation: any
diagram in P-I which can be written using generators that do
not involve causal systems can be considered as the image
of some process in INF under i, as in Eq. (68).
We have so far introduced the epistemic and procedural
theories and the maps from these into the primary theory
P-I, namely,
PROC P-I INF
e i . (101)
We now introduce the prediction map9, which describes
the inferences one can make in a given scenario. The
prediction map p is a partial DP map whose domain is the
9 The idea of separating out the descriptive and the probabilistic
components of one’s notion of an operational theory can be found in
earlier works, notably Ref. [7].
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set of causally closed processes in P-I, and whose co-domain
is INF.
An example of the sort of causally closed processes on
which p is defined is:
Aσ
pi
X
q , (102)
A diagram which has open causal inputs or outputs is not
in the domain of the prediction map, because the open
causal wires correspond to systems about which no state
of knowledge or propositional question has been specified.
For example, the inferences one should make in a situation
described by the diagram
A
pi
X
q
(103)
depend on what one knows about previous procedures on A
as well as any propositions one considers about X.
Consider first the simple case of closed diagrams—the
scalars in P-I. These are mapped to scalars in INF—elements
of [0,1]. For example,
pi
σ
p
= Prob(pi||σ); (104)
the prediction map tells us the probability that we should
assign to the proposition pi being true given that our state of
knowledge is σ. Meanwhile,
p
?X X (105)
is a stochastic map in INF. This, for instance, specifies the
probability one should assign for any proposition about X
given any state of knowledge about how X was prepared.
There is an obvious consistency constraint on processes in
P-I which are also processes in the sub-process-theory INF,
that is, those that are in the image of i. If one maps a process
in INF to P-I by the inclusion map i and then back to INF via
the prediction map p, one should clearly obtain the process
itself back again, so that
s
YX
i
p
= s YX . (106)
Hence it is a partial left inverse of i, that is, p◦ i=1INF.
Although p is only a partial map, it is still
diagram-preserving on its domain; e.g., one can write
pi
σ
p
= pi
σ
p
p
p
. (107)
In summary, an operational CI theory is specified by a
triple of process theories and a triple of DP maps between
them, succinctly drawn as
PROC P-I INF
p
e i , (108)
where we use a dashed line to denote the fact that p is partial.
1. Properties of the prediction map
Our constraint of ignorability, Eq. (95), implies that the
probabilities assigned to propositions about systems are
independent of what is known about the future processes
applied to the system. For example, the probability
pi
σ
p
τ =
pi
σ
p
τ
(109)
=
pi
σ
p
(110)
is seen to be independent of the state of knowledge τ. In
Ref. [7], this constraint is termed ‘causality’, and taken to be
of central importance. In our framework, however, it does
not express any notion of causality. As we discuss further
in Appendix B, the causal structure in our framework is
primitive, and cannot be defined in terms of any probabilistic
facts such as those expressed by Eq. (110). In our framework,
Eq. (95) does not play a particularly special role; it is simply
a fact about the way one makes inferences. In addition to
implying Eq. (110), it implies many similar independence
relations. For example, it implies that a state of knowledge
τ about a causal process occurring on one subsystem of a
composite whose output is ignored is irrelevant for making
inferences about the other subsystem:
τ
pi
σ
p
=
τ
pi
σ
p
(111)
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=
pi
σ
p
.
(112)
Conveniently, p can be fully specified by a relatively simple
set of data: the probabilities assigned to point-distributed
states of knowledge and atomic propositions. This is exactly
the form of data provided in traditional approaches to
operational theories.
Theorem IV.1. For every process D ∈ P-I in the domain of
p : P-I→ INF , the image p(D) ofD under p is fully specified
by the probabilities assigned to atomic propositions on its
output and point distributions on its input.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary causally closed processD and
imagine mapping it into Inf via
D
p
X Y . (113)
This is simply a substochastic map living in INF and hence is
fully characterized by the set of scalars D
p
JyK[x]

x∈X ,y∈Y
. (114)
Such scalars can be rewritten as
D
p
JyK[x] = D
p
JyK[x]
pp
i i
(115)
= D
p
JyK[x]
i i
;
(116)
that is, they are the probabilities assigned to atomic
propositions JyK on Y given point distributions [x] on X ,
which is what we set out to prove.
2. Quantum theory as an operational CI theory
The most straightforward way to cast quantum theory as
an operational CI theory is as follows. The causal subtheory
for quantum theory, which we denote PROCQ , contains
laboratory procedures whose inputs and outputs are classical
and quantum systems. The inferential subtheory is the
classical one, INF. The full theory, PQ-I, is constructed as
INFPQ-IPROCQ
eQ iQ
pQ
. (117)
Here, the specific prediction map pQ singles out quantum
theory, and is defined as follows. To every quantum
system is associated an algebra of operators on a complex
Hilbert space of some dimension, and to every classical
system is associated an algebra of commuting operators
on such a Hilbert space; to every diagram is associated a
completely-positive [32] trace-nonincreasing map between
these; then, the joint probability distributions (on any
set of propositions attached to the classical systems) can
be computed by composition of these completely-positive
trace-preserving maps.
B. Classical realist causal-inferential theories
Next, we turn our attention to the second class of
causal-inferential theories that we will consider, namely
classical realist CI theories. These are very similar to the
operational CI theories just introduced, but the causal theory
is not taken to be a process theory PROC of laboratory
procedures, but rather a process theory representing
fundamental dynamics of ontic systems. In our case we
will take this to be the process theory FUNC of functional
dynamics, introduced in Section II B. The extra structure
in FUNC relative to PROC accounts for all the differences
between operational CI theories and the classical realist CI
theory within our framework, and implies that the latter has
a unique prediction map.
We will use the term ‘classical realist CI theory’ to refer to
a causal-inferential theory of functional dynamics, namely
FUNC F-I INF
p∗
e′ i′ . (118)
We have labeled the diagram-preserving maps here by e′, i′
and p∗ to distinguish them from those in an operational CI
theory.
The construction proceeds much like that in the previous
section. INF is a subprocess theory of F-I, explicitly
represented by the inclusion of INF into F-I via a DP map
i′ : INF→ F-I , diagrammatically represented as
s
YX
i′
. (119)
FUNC is not a sub-process-theory of F-I, but rather embeds
into F-I via a map e′ : FUNC→ F-I , which we will define after
introducing some relevant generators.
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The first generator again allows one to specify a state of
knowledge about the functional dynamics. There is one such
generator for each pair of systems (Λ,Λ′), depicted as
ΛΛ′
Λ
Λ′
. (120)
Then, the diagram
Λ
Λ′
σ
ΛΛ′ (121)
represents the state of knowledge σ about the function from
Λ to Λ′ describing the dynamics. Naturally, we demand that
constraints analogous to those in Eq. (74) and Eq. (77) are
satisfied, which then implies that we can construct a DP map
e′ : FUNC→ F-I defined as
f
Λ
Λ′
e′
:=
Λ
Λ′
[ f ]
ΛΛ′ . (122)
The second generator allows us to directly gain knowledge
from an ontological system, or equivalently, to ask a question
about a system by attaching a proposition to it. Here, we see
the first key distinction between ontological and operational
CI theories—for operational CI theories, we could only define
such a generator for classical systems; however, because all
systems in FUNC are sets Λ, this generator
Λ
Λ
Λ
(123)
can be defined for any system in F-I. Naturally, we demand
that each such generator satisfies constraints analogous to
Eqs. (89) and Eqs. (91).
Finally, we introduce a generator
Λ (124)
which represents ignoring the system Λ and which satisfies
constraints analogous to Eq. (94) and Eq. (95).
We now have the tools to describe a wide range of
scenarios. For example, the scenario
Λ
σ
pi
Λ′
τ
(125)
might arise as a classical realist model of the operational
scenario in Diagram (98). This is analogous to a
prepare-measure scenario. Even in this simple causal
structure, however, we can also describe more general
inferential structures; for example, an analogue of
Diagram (99), namely
Λ
σ pi
Λ′
q
. (126)
In fact, this is even more general than Diagram (99), since
in F-I (unlike in P-I), one can consider propositions about
arbitrary systems.
Perhaps the central distinction between P-I and F-I is that
in F-I, there is a constraint on the interactions between the
first two generators we introduced. This constraint is a
consequence of the fact that one can attach propositions
to any system in F-I, together with our assumption that the
causal mechanisms are described by functions. It is due to
this single extra constraint that classical realist CI theories
have so much more structure than operational CI theories.
This constraint allows us to replace knowledge about the
output Λ′ of some functional dynamics with a particular
form of joint knowledge about the functional dynamics and
its input:
Λ
Λ′
Λ′
ΛΛ′ =
Λ
Λ′
Λ′
ΛΛ′ , (127)
where the black diamond converts a state of knowledge
about Λ and a state of knowledge about ΛΛ′ into a state of
knowledge aboutΛ′, and is defined by linearity and its action
on delta-function states of knowledge, namely,
[ f ]
Λ′Λ
ΛΛ′
= f Λ
′Λ (128)
In particular, this implies the consistency condition
Λ
Λ
?Λ = Λ
Λ
?Λ . (129)
where, in this special case, the black diamond is simply the
isormorphism between ?Λ and Λ. We henceforth denote
this isomorphism by
Λ ?Λ and Λ?Λ , (130)
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so that
Λ
?Λ
= Λ?Λ (131)
and
Λ
Λ
?Λ = Λ
Λ
?Λ . (132)
Predictions are made in a classical realist CI theory in
a manner analogous to how predictions are made in an
operational CI theory. They are represented by a partial
diagram-preserving map, p∗ : F-I→ INF , whose domain is
given by the set of causally closed processes in F-I. As before,
the prediction map is a partial left inverse of i′, so that
p∗◦i′ =1INF. For example, scalars in F-I are mapped to scalars
in INF—elements of [0,1]; e.g.,
pi
σ
p∗
Λ
=Prob(pi||σ) . (133)
Meanwhile,
p∗
(134)
is a stochastic map in INF, as before. Analogous to
Theorem IV.1, one has that for every process D ∈ F-I in
the domain of the prediction map p∗, its image under p∗
is fully specified by the probabilities assigned to atomic
propositions on its output given point distributions on its
input.
There is a key difference between the prediction map in a
classical realist and in an operational CI theory: for classical
realist CI theories, this map is unique. To show this, we first
prove a normal form for general diagrams in F-I.
Theorem IV.2. Any diagram in the classical realist CI theory
F-I can be rewritten (using rewrite rules in F-I) into the form
S
i′
, (135)
where S is a substochastic map in INF.
Proof. See Appendix D 4.
We conjecture that this normal form is unique, or
equivalently, that the substochastic map S is unique. (To
prove this, it would suffice to prove that the normal
form description of each generator is unique, since the
composition of two diagrams in normal forms has a unique
normal form description.)
Note that there is not an equivalent normal form for
diagrams in operational CI theories, as Theorem IV.2 strongly
relies on the constraint of Eq. (127). This normal form then
allows us to prove that the interactions between INF and
FUNC single out a unique prediction map for the full theory
F-I.
Theorem IV.3. The prediction map p∗ is unique.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary process in the domain of
p∗—that is, an arbitrary causally closed processD. Writing it
in normal form, we have
D = S
i′
, (136)
for some substochastic map S. Furthermore, S is unique
since i′ is an inclusion map and hence injective. Applying
the prediction map, then, one has
D
p∗
= S
p∗
i′
= S ,
(137)
where the last line follows from the fact that p∗ ◦ i′ = 1INF.
Hence, the prediction map applied to any process in its
domain is associated to a unique real matrix, and so p∗ is
unique.
The full picture of a classical realist CI theory is therefore
given by a triple of process theories and a triple of DP maps
between them:
FUNC F-I INF
p∗
e′ i′ , (138)
where we use a dashed line to denote that p∗ is partial.
We close this section by noting that it remains to
determine the scope of classical realist CI theories—e.g., it is
unclear whether Bohmian mechanics can formally be cast as
such a theory. (Note that this is not specific to our framework;
it is also unclear whether it can be formalized within the
standard framework of ontological models.) In any case, we
note that the central aim of our framework is not to capture
the diversity of interpretational views, but rather to make
progress on the questions posed in the introduction.
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V. INFERENTIAL EQUIVALENCE
We now define a notion of inferential equivalence between
processes in a causal-inferential theory. This definition can
clearly be made in any causal-inferential theory, but we
will focus here only on operational CI theories and then on
classical realist CI theories. This will let us define quotiented
operational CI theories and quotiented classical realist CI
theories. We will discuss how the former relates to the
notion of a generalized probabilistic theory, while the latter
subsumes the traditional notion of an ontological model.
A. Inferential equivalence in operational CI theories
Two elements of P-I are inferentially equivalent if and only
if they lead to exactly the same predictions, no matter which
causally closed diagram they are embedded in. To make such
statements diagrammatically, it is useful to introduce the
notion of a tester for a given process—that is, a special case
of a clamp (introduced in Section I A) whose composition
with a given process yields a causally closed diagram. As a
simple example, we say that two states of knowledge σ
AB
and σ′
AB about a transformation procedure from A to B are
inferentially equivalent, denoted
σ
A
B
∼p σ′
A
B
, (139)
if and only if they make the same predictions for all testers,
T , so that
σ
A
B
T
p
= σ′
A
B
T
p
∀T ∈ P-I.
(140)
As an explicit example from within quantum theory,
consider four lists of laboratory instructions, denoted P1
to P4, that are designed to prepare the quantum states |0〉,
|1〉, |+〉, and |−〉, respectively. Then, the states of knowledge
1
2
[P1]+ 1
2
[P2] and
1
2
[P3]+ 1
2
[P4] (141)
are distinct but inferentially equivalent. This is easily seen
by the fact that both states of knowledge correspond to the
same quantum state (namely the maximally mixed state).
More generally, the notion of inferential equivalence for
any type of process in P-I is defined as follows:
Definition V.1 (Inferential equivalence for operational CI
theories). Two processes in P-I, D and E , are inferentially
equivalent with respect to the prediction map p, denoted
D ∼p E , if and only if
D
T
p
= E
T
p
∀T ∈ P-I.
(142)
In fact, one can test for inferential equivalence purely in
terms of probabilities (as opposed to stochastic maps).
Lemma V.2. One has inferential equivalence D ∼p E if and
only if
D
T
p
= E
T
p
∀T ∈ P-I. (143)
Proof. This follows immediately from Definition V.1 and
Theorem IV.1.
For processes that are causally closed this condition
greatly simplifies:
Lemma V.3. Two causally closed processes are inferentially
equivalent if and only if they are equal as stochastic maps
under the application of the prediction map p:
D ∼p E ⇐⇒ D
p
= E
p
.
(144)
This is a much simpler condition to check, since one need
not quantify over all possible testers.
Proof. By definition,
D ∼p E (145)
is equivalent to
∀T D
T
p
= E
T
p
, (146)
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which is equivalent to
∀T D
T
p
p
= E
T
p
p
(147)
by diagram-preservation. Finally, this is equivalent to
D
p
= E
p
, (148)
where the ⇒ direction follows from the special case where
T is simply the identity on the two inferential systems, and
where the⇐ direction follows from the fact that equality is
preserved by composition (in this case, with p(T )).
For the still more restricted set of processes in the image
of i : INF→ P-I , the condition simplifies even further:
Corollary V.4. Two processes in the image of i : INF→ P-I
are inferentially equivalent if and only if they are equal as
substochastic maps in INF:
σ
i
∼p σ′
i
⇐⇒ σ = σ′ .
(149)
Proof. By Lemma V.3, we have that the LHS of the implication
in the corollary is equivalent to the equality
σ
i
p
= σ′
i
p
, (150)
which gives the RHS of the implication in the corollary by
Eq. (106), namely p◦ i=1INF.
These results imply that every causally closed process is
associated to a unique stochastic map.
Lemma V.5. Every causally closed process D ∈ P-I is
inferentially equivalent to a unique process in the image of i,
namely,
D ∼p D
p
i
. (151)
Proof. The constraint on the prediction map p of Eq. (106)
immediately implies that
D
p
= D
p
i
p
, (152)
after which Lemma V.3 implies that
D ∼p D
p
i
(153)
and then Corollary V.4 implies that this is the unique process
in the image of i in the equivalence class ofD.
1. Quotiented operational CI theories
In many cases, one is only interested in the inferential
equivalence class of processes in a causal-inferential theory.
In such cases, it is useful to define a new type of theory,
wherein one has quotiented10 with respect to inferential
equivalence. We now show how this is done for operational
CI theories.
First, we note that the relation ∼p is preserved under
parallel and sequential composition, and hence is a
congruence relation.
Lemma V.6. The relation ∼p defines a process-theory
congruence relation for P-I. That is, ifD ∼p E , then
D
C
∼p E
C
(154)
for all clamps C in P-I.
Proof. Consider, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists some C ∗ such that Eq. (154) fails. Then, there exists
10 Notions of quotiented operational theories can be found in earlier works,
notably including Ref. [7].
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some testerT ∗ such that
D
C ∗
p
T ∗
6= E
C ∗
p
T ∗
.
(155)
This, however, would imply that the tester
C ∗
T ∗
(156)
generates different inferences forD and E , in contradiction
with our initial assumption thatD ∼p E .
It follows that one can quotient the operational CI theory
with respect to this congruence relation.
Definition V.7. We define a quotiented operational CI theory
P˜-I as the process theory P-I quotiented by the congruence
relation ∼p. That is, it has the same systems as P-I, but its
processes correspond to equivalence classes of processes in P-I,
that is, to maximal sets of inferentially equivalent processes.
We can moreover define a DP map ∼p: P-I→ P˜-I , as
D
∼p
= D˜ , (157)
where D˜ is the equivalence class which containsD.
Clearly, one has
D ∼p E ⇐⇒ D
∼p
= E
∼p
.
(158)
It is worth noting that in our framework, a quotiented
operational CI theory is not an operational CI theory, since
equivalence classes of states of knowledge about procedures
are not themselves states of knowledge about procedures.
This is because the quotienting operation necessarily loses
information, such that the quotiented theory does not
specify enough information to define an operational CI
theory. For example, the scalars in the quotiented theory
are (isomorphic to) probabilities, while in the operational
CI theory, scalars constitute a complete description of what
one knows and what one is asking in the scenario under
consideration.
Using the quotienting map, the probability associated with
a closed diagram can always be decomposed into a sequence
of stochastic maps representing one’s inferences, by grouping
together processes into diagrams which are causally closed,
e.g.
σ1
σ2
σ3
pi
∼p
∼p ∼p
∼p ∼p
∼p
. (159)
Clearly ∼p can be used to define two new DP maps, e˜ :
PROC → P˜-I and i˜ : INF → P˜-I, where e˜ =∼p ◦e and i˜ =∼p
◦i. We can also introduce a partial diagram-preserving
prediction map p˜ for the quotiented operational CI theory,
whose action is given by mapping each process in P˜-I to an
element (any element) of P-I in its equivalence class, and
then mapping that element to INF via p. All of this can be
concisely represented in the following commuting diagram:
PROC P-I INF
p
e i
P˜-I
∼pe˜
i˜
p˜
. (160)
2. Subsuming the framework of generalized probabilistic theories
At this point, one can see the relationship between
our framework and another well-known framework
for operational theories, namely, that of generalized
probabilistic theories (GPTs).
A GPT is a minimal framework in which processes are
wired together to form circuits which describe an operational
scenario and predict the probabilities of the outcomes that
one might observe. Perhaps the key feature of a GPT is
tomographic completeness, which implies that processes
within a GPT are taken to represent equivalence classes
of procedures or events with respect to the operational
predictions. That is, two transformations in a GPT are
represented distinctly if and only if there exists a circuit in
which they can be embedded to give different probabilities
for the outcome of some measurement in that circuit. The set
of processes is also assumed to be convex and representable
in a (typically finite dimensional) real vector space, to
have a unique deterministic effect, and for composition of
processes to be bilinear.
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In forthcoming work [33], we prove that these properties
are satisfied for a natural subset of processes in any
quotiented operational CI theory (i.e., the inferentially closed
processes), and that consequently the latter can be identified
with GPT processes in the traditional sense. Tomography
follows naturally from the quotienting which defines P˜-I, and
convexity of these processes is inherited from convexity of
the inferential theory.
However, the quotiented operational CI theories in
our framework are not equivalent to GPTs.There remain
important formal and conceptual differences between the
two. For example, a quotiented operational CI theory
contains both causal and inferential systems and processes,
while GPTs contain only a single type of system. As a
consequence, our quotiented operational CI theory contains
processes with both causal and inferential inputs and
outputs, while GPTs simply do not make any such distinction.
It is also worth noting that GPT processes are conventionally
viewed as representing equivalence classes of laboratory
procedures, while processes in a quotiented operational
CI theory have a different interpretation—they represent
equivalence classes of states of knowledge about laboratory
procedures.
B. Inferential equivalence in classical realist CI theories
Analogously, two elements of F-I are inferentially
equivalent if and only if they lead to exactly the same
predictions, no matter what causal diagram they are
embedded in.
Definition V.8 (Inferential equivalence for classical realist
CI theories). Two general elements of F-I, D and E , are
inferentially equivalent with respect to the prediction map
p∗, denotedD ∼p∗ E , if and only if
D
T
p∗
= E
T
p∗
∀T ∈ F-I.
(161)
As an explicit example, consider the four bit-to-bit
functions { f0, f1, fid, fflip}. They are defined by their action
on a bit a ∈ {0,1}, namely, f0(a) = 0, f1(a) = 1, fid(a) = a,
and fflip(a)= a⊕1, where ⊕ denotes summation modulo 2.
Then, the states of knowledge 12 [ f0]+ 12 [ f1] and 12 [ fid]+ 12 [ fflip]
are distinct but inferentially equivalent. This is easily seen
by the fact that both states of knowledge correspond to the
stochastic map ( 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
, (162)
that is, the fully randomizing channel.
Every process in F-I can be associated with a stochastic
map, via
D 7→ D
p∗
. (163)
Using Lemma E.1 (stated and proven in Appendix E 1), we
can prove the following result, which is an analogue of
Lemma V.3, but strengthened to include processes with open
causal systems.
Lemma V.9. Two processes in F˜-I are inferentially equivalent
if and only if they are associated with the same substochastic
map. That is,
D ∼p∗ E ⇐⇒ D
p∗
= E
p∗
.
(164)
The proof is given in Appendix E 2.
1. Quotiented classical realist CI theories
In direct analogy with Lemma (V.6) and its proof, one can
show that ∼p∗ defines a congruence relation, and it follows
that one can quotient the classical realist CI theory with
respect to this relation.
Definition V.10. We define a quotiented classical realist
CI theory F˜-I as the process theory F-I quotiented by the
congruence ∼p∗ . That is, it has the same systems as F-I, but
its processes correspond to equivalence classes of processes in
F-I, defined as the maximal sets of inferentially equivalent
processes. We can moreover define a DP map ∼p∗ : F-I→ F˜-I .
We denote this as
D
∼p∗
= D˜ , (165)
where D˜ is the equivalence class which containsD.
Clearly, one has
D ∼p∗ E ⇐⇒ D
∼p∗
= E
∼p∗
.
(166)
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Clearly ∼p∗ can be used to define two new DP maps
e˜′ : FUNC → F˜-I and i˜′ : INF → F˜-I, where e˜′ =∼p∗ ◦e′ and
i˜′ =∼p∗ ◦i′. We can also introduce a prediction map p˜∗ for the
quotiented classical realist CI theory, whose action is given
by mapping each process in F˜-I to an element (any element)
of F-I in its equivalence class, and then mapping that element
to INF via p∗. All of this can be concisely represented in the
following commuting diagram:
Proc F-I Inf
p∗
e′ i′
F˜-I
∼p∗e˜
′ i˜′
p˜∗
. (167)
Finally, we derive a simplified normal form for F˜-I. First, we
show (in Appendix E 3, using some useful identities proven
in Appendix D) that
Theorem V.11. Any diagram in F-I is always inferentially
equivalent to one of the form
Σ
Πi′
i′
, (168)
where Σ is a stochastic map and Π is a propositional map.
Applying the quotienting map (and recalling that it is
diagram-preserving and that it leaves processes in INF
invariant), this implies that
Corollary V.12. Any diagram in F˜-I can be rewritten into the
following normal form:
Σ
Πi˜′
i˜′
∼p∗
∼p∗
. (169)
2. Subsuming the traditional notion of an ontological model
We can now point out a connection between our
framework and the traditional notion of an ontological
model [6]. Namely, we see that the stochastic processes
in the codomain of the traditional ontological modeling
map (such as epistemic states and response functions) are
recovered as the substochastic maps defined by our Eq. (163).
Note, however, that our quotiented classical realist CI theory
contains both causal and inferential systems and processes,
while traditional ontological models concern only a single
type of system. We will say much more about representing
operational theories in Section VI and onward.
C. To make an omelette...
A causal-inferential theory allows one to describe a
physical scenario while maintaining the distinction between
the causal and inferential components of the theory.
The process of quotienting this theory with respect to
inferential equivalence constitutes a partial rescrambling
of the omelette. This point will be discussed further in
a subsequent paper [33] which shows the sense in which
GPTs are recovered from quotientied operational CI theories.
For now, we will give a few concrete examples involving
processes in F-I in order to clarify how causation and
inference get scrambled.
Our first example is the one introduced in Section V B,
involving the two states of knowledge
σc := 1
2

B
B
+ 12

B
¬
B
 and σd := 12

B
B
0
+ 12

B
B
1

(170)
about bit-to-bit functional dynamics. The two states of
knowledge refer to completely distinct causal scenarios:
the first state of knowledge has support only on causally
connected processes, while the second state of knowledge
has support only on causally disconnected processes.
Nonetheless, these two states of knowledge are inferentially
equivalent:
B
B
σc ∼p∗
B
B
σd . (171)
Indeed, the stochastic map associated with each of these via
Eq. (163) is given by the completely randomizing channel,
Eq. (162). Naively, one might expect that this justifies
the belief that the input and output systems are causally
disconnected, and yet we see explicitly that this is not true in
the case described by σc .
As a second example, consider the inferential equivalence
B B
σa
∼p∗
e′
B B
B
σb
, (172)
where
σa := 1
2
[
B
0
]
⊗
[
B
0
]
+ 1
2
[
B
1
]
⊗
[
B
1
]
, and (173)
σb :=
1
2
[
B
0
]
+ 1
2
[
B
1
]
. (174)
Again, these two processes describe completely distinct
causal scenarios: the process on the LHS does not involve
a causal connection between the two systems, while in the
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process on the RHS, the two systems are connected by a
common cause. And yet the two are inferentially equivalent;
they correspond to the same stochastic map, namely the
probability distribution 12 [0]⊗ [0]+ 12 [1]⊗ [1]. Naively, one
might expect that this justifies the belief that the two systems
are causally connected, and yet we see explicitly that this is
not true in the case described by σa .
In each example, two radically different causal structures
(causal connection and causal disconnection) lead one to
make all of the same inferences about the relevant systems.
Similar examples can be constructed in P-I. Correspondingly,
the processes in quotiented causal-inferential theories
exhibit a scrambling of causation and inference.
VI. CLASSICAL REALIST REPRESENTATIONS
A. Classical realist representations of operational CI theories
A classical realist representation of an operational theory
is an attempt to provide an underlying realist explanation
of the operational statistics. It posits that each system is
characterized by an ontic state, which constitutes a complete
characterization of its physical attributes and mediates
causal influences between the laboratory procedures. In
earlier work, representations akin to the classical realist
CI representations described herein went by the name of
ontological models11.
Definition VI.1. A classical realist representation of
an operational CI theory is a diagram-preserving map
ξ : P-I→ F-I into the classical realist CI theory, depicted
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
, (175)
satisfying (i) the preservation of predictions, namely that the
diagram
P-I INF
INFF-I
ξ
i
p
i′
p∗
(176)
commutes, where the double line between the two copies of
INF is an extended equals sign, and (ii) the preservation of
11 Note that the term ‘ontological model’ is arguably deficient—both for
the type of representation considered here and the type considered in
previous work—because such representations contain both ontological
and epistemological aspects.
ignorability
ξA
ΛA
=
ΛA
. (177)
Note that ξ : P-I→ F-I leaves inferential systems invariant.
This can be derived from preservation of predictions, as
follows. Start with some inferential system X in the top right
of the commuting square (Eq. (176)). There are two paths to
the bottom left: in one direction, we map via the inclusion
map i to the same system X in P-I and then via the classical
realist representation ξ to ξX in F-I; in the other direction, we
map via the equality to the same system X in the other copy
of INF and then by the inclusion map i′ to the system X in F-I.
We then see that the only way that the diagram can commute
is if ξX = X .
The fact that we take a classical realist representation
to be diagram-preserving is an immediate consequence of
our choice to take diagrams in an operational CI theory to
represent one’s hypothesis about the fundamental causal
and inferential structure in the given scenario. Since
an ontological representation is meant to be the most
fundamental description of one’s scenario, it should respect
this hypothesis, with the only difference being that it will
generally be a more fine-grained description (e.g. where
laboratory procedures are replaced by functional dynamics).
We will leave to Appendix B the reason behind our choice
to have operational CI diagrams represent fundamental
structure, and we also show therein that this choice does not
limit the scope of possible classical realist representations in
our framework.
A particularly natural class of classical realist
representations are those which can be thought of simply as
representing every state of knowledge about a procedure by
a corresponding state of knowledge about the function that
underlies it.12 Diagrammatically, these are represented as
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
= ΞBA
ΛAΛBAB
ΛB
ΛA
, (178)
where ΞBA must be stochastic (so that ignoring is represented
correctly) and must satisfy a set of compositionality
12 One might wonder whether this is sufficiently general given that for a
procedure mapping system A to system B , the variable ΛB might not
be a function of ΛA alone but of ΛA together with some local auxiliary
variable Λ (whose value is drawn from some probability distribution).
Such worries are unfounded, however, since every value of Λ defines a
function from ΛA to ΛB , and a probability distribution over this value
induces a probability distribution over the latter function.
27
constraints in order for ξ to be diagram-preserving, e.g.,
ΛBΛC
ΛAΛB
ΛAΛCΞCB
ΞBA
AB
BC
=
BC
AB ΛAΛCΞCAAC .
(179)
This class is so natural, in fact, that one might even wish to
demand that a classical realist representation be defined by
such a constraint, although we have not done so here.
Whether it is part of the definition or not, it is often
sufficient to focus on this class alone because it turns out
that every classical realist representation is inferentially
equivalent to one in this class.
Theorem VI.2. Any classical realist representation ξ satisfies
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
∼p∗ ΞBA
ΛAΛBAB
ΛB
ΛA
, (180)
where ΞBA is a stochastic map taking states of knowledge
about operational procedures to states of knowledge about
functional dynamics.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix F 1.
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether or not all classical
realist representations, as defined in Definition VI.1, are
of the form of Eq. (178). For example, classical realist
representations of the form
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
=
AB
ΛB
ΛA
ΛAΛBΞBA
ΛA (181)
may be consistent with Definition VI.1, and appear to be
more general than those of the form of Eq. (178). Such
models, however, seem to fail to satisfy an assumption
of autonomy—that the fundamental dynamics are
independent of their inputs—and this may be grounds
for dismissing them as candidates for a classical realist
representation. It remains to be seen whether these can
indeed be ruled out from our definition, or ruled out as a
consequence of some formal notion of autonomy (that one
might consider adding to Definition VI.1).
The question of the existence of a classical realist
representation of an operational CI theory is closely
connected to the pre-existing question of whether a given
operational theory violates Bell-like inequalities. We explore
the connection in Section VII A.
B. Classical realist representations of quotiented operational
CI theories
It is also useful to define classical realist representations
of quotiented operational CI theories.
Definition VI.3. A classical realist representation of a
quotiented operational CI theory is a diagram-preserving
map ξ˜ : P˜-I→ F˜-I from such a theory to a quotiented classical
realist CI theory, depicted
ξ˜
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
, (182)
satisfying (i) the preservation of predictions, namely that the
diagram
P˜-I INF
INFF˜-I
ξ˜
i˜
p˜
i˜′
p˜∗
, (183)
commutes, where the double line between the two copies of
INF is an extended equals sign, and (ii) the preservation of
ignorability
ξ˜A
ΛA
=
ΛA
∼p∗
. (184)
Representations of this sort are analogous to the
embedding maps introduced in Ref. [34] in the context of
prepare-measure scenarios. (These took the state and effect
spaces of a GPT into an ontological model in the traditional
sense.)
Proposition VI.4. The classical realist representation map ξ˜
can be written as
ξ˜
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
∼p
= ΞBA
ΛAΛBAB
ΛB
ΛA
∼p∗
, (185)
where ΞBA is a stochastic map taking states of knowledge
about operational procedures to states of knowledge about
functional dynamics.
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Proof. The proof is a direct adaptation of the proof of
Theorem VI.2, but where the starting point, Eq. (F3), is
modified by replacing the inferential equivalence with
equality and using the normal form for F˜-I as given
by Corollary V.12 , and where one uses the form of
Lemma D.1 which involves equality rather than inferential
equivalence.
C. Leibnizianity (formalized)
A natural methodological principle to impose on
candidate realist explanations of operational facts is the
following [25]:
If an ontological theory implies the existence
of two scenarios that are empirically
indistinguishable in principle but ontologically
distinct (where both indistinguishability and
distinctness are evaluated by the lights of
the theory in question), then the ontological
theory should be rejected and replaced with
one relative to which the two scenarios are
ontologically identical.
In Ref. [25], it is argued that this methodological principle
was proposed by Leibniz as a version of his principle of the
identity of indiscernibles and that it was strongly endorsed
(at least implicitly) by Einstein. We shall refer to it here as
Leibniz’s methodological principle.
Insofar as our framework seeks to formalize the
relationship between an operational theory and a realist
theory that might underlie it, it is a natural framework in
which to attempt to provide a formal characterization of
Leibniz’s methodological principle. Our formal version of
the principle actually constitutes a generalization of the
principle to one that applies to theories that describe not just
ontology (i.e., causal aspects of the theory) but epistemology
as well (i.e., inferential aspects of the theory).
We formalize the new version of the principle as a
constraint on realist representations, which we term
Leibnizianity.
Definition VI.5 (Leibnizianity of a classical realist
representation). A classical realist representation map
ξ : P-I→ F-I is said to be Leibnizian if it preserves inferential
equivalence relations.
More formally, a classical realist representation map ξ is
Leibnizian if for any pair of inferentially equivalent processes
D,E ∈ P-I, one has
D ∼p E =⇒ D
ξ
∼p∗ E
ξ
.
(186)
This means that if two processes lead one to make the
same inferences when embedded into any diagram within
the operational CI theory, then their representations within
the classical realist CI theory must be such that they lead one
to make all the same inferences when embedded into any
diagram within the classical realist CI theory. A consequence
of this is that “inferentially equivalent states of knowledge
about experimental procedures must be represented by
inferentially equivalent states of knowledge about functional
dynamics.”
An equivalent (process-theoretic) characterization of
Leibnizianity is the following.
Proposition VI.6. A classical realist representation ξ is
Leibnizian if and only if there exists a classical realist
representation ξ˜ : P˜-I → F˜-I such that the following diagram
commutes:
P-I
P˜-I
F-I
F˜-Iξ
ξ˜
∼p
∼p∗
. (187)
A representation ξ is said to be nonLeibnizian if there
does not exist any such diagram-preserving map ξ˜. A given
operational CI theory may admit of both Leibnizian and
nonLeibnizian classical realist representations, and will be
termed F-I-Leibnizian if it admits of at least one Leibnizian
classical realist representation. (Note that we have included
the modifier F-I on the term Leibnizianity, since Leibnizianity
is a property of the relationship between the two process
theories.)
We have just described the implication ∃ Leibnizian ξ =⇒
∃ ξ˜. Whether the implication ∃ Leibnizian ξ ⇐= ∃ ξ˜ holds
remains an open question, but we conjecture that it does:
Conjecture 1. If a quotiented operational CI theory admits
of a classical realist representation (as a quotiented classical
realist CI theory), then the unquotiented operational CI theory
admits of a Leibnizian classical realist representation (as an
unquotiented classical realist CI theory). More formally, if
there exists a map ξ˜ : P˜-I→ F˜-I satisfying Definition VI.3, then
there exists a map ξ : P-I→ F-I satisfying Definition VI.1 and
which makes the diagram of Eq. (187) commute.
Hence, we have
∃ Leibnizian ξ
?⇐==⇒ ∃ ξ˜. (188)
Note that a classical realist representation ξ˜ of a
quotiented operational CI theory cannot itself be said to
be either Leibnizian or nonLeibnizian. This is because in
quotiented CI theories, there are no distinct but inferentially
equivalent processes, for which one could ask whether their
representations are inferentially equivalent or not.
Consider a distribution over classical variables in some
experimental scenario that is both PQ-I-realizable and
F-I-realizable. It is said to be “PQ-I-F-I-Leibnizian” if the
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realization of the distribution within F-I can be obtained
as the image of its realization within PQ-I via a classical
realist representation map ξ that is Leibnizian. (Note
that we have included both PQ-I and F-I as modifiers
of the term Leibnizian here, since (as mentioned above)
Leibnizianity is a property of the relationship between
the two process theories.) Then, one obtains a no-go
theorem for Leibnizian classical realist representations by
proving, for some causal-inferential structure, that the set
of PQ-I-realizable distributions over observed variables is
not included in the set of PQ-I−F-I-Leibnizian distributions.
The constraints that pick out the set of PQ-I-F-I-Leibnizian
distributions will be termed Leibnizianity inequalities, and
are the counterpart of noncontextuality inequalities [35–37]
in our framework.
In Refs. [6, 25], it was argued that it is the plausibility of the
Leibnizian methodological principle that accounts for the
plausibility of the principle of generalized noncontextuality
defined in Ref. [6]. Indeed, our notion of Leibnizianity
turns out to have a close connection to the notion of
generalized noncontextuality. We discuss this connection in
Section VIII A.
D. Summary of the basic framework
The full set of process theories and DP maps that we have
introduced can be summarized by the following diagram
(which is color-coded to match the intuitive schematic given
below):
P-I INF
P˜-I
INFF-I
F˜-I
ξ
ξ˜
PROC
FUNC
e i
p
e′ i′
p∗
∼pe˜ i˜ p˜
i˜′ p˜∗∼p∗e˜
′
. (189)
The top slice of this describes an operational CI theory
(in blue) and its quotienting (in purple), while the bottom
slice describes a classical realist CI theory (in red) and its
quotienting (in magenta). The unquotiented classical realist
and operational CI theories are constructed out of their
respective causal theory (FUNC or PROC) together with the
classical theory of inference (INF), which is common to both.
The map ξ (if it exists) constitutes a representation of an
operational CI theory P-I by a classical realist CI theory F-I,
while the map ξ˜ (if it exists) constitutes a representation
of a quotiented operational CI theory P˜-I by a quotiented
classical realist CI theory F˜-I. If both ξ and ξ˜ exist and the
square Eq. (187) commutes, then we say that ξ is a Leibnizian
classical realist representation.
Fig. (189) is summarized by the following schematic:
The form of Fig. 189 might lead one to wonder about
whether there ought to be a diagram-preserving map from
PROC to FUNC. One could define such a map, but it would
state that every procedure could be associated to a unique
function acting on the ontic states. This is not what we
expect of a classical realist model of an operational theory, as
laboratory procedures typically constitute a coarse-grained
description, and as such is not associated with a unique
function, but rather a distribution over these.
We refer the reader to Appendix A for a discussion of
prior work that is related to (or provided inspiration for) our
framework.
VII. BELL-LIKE NO-GO THEOREMS
A. Bell-like inequalities as a consequence of classical realist
representations
Consider a bipartite Bell experiment where X and Y
denote the setting variables, and A and B denote the
outcome variables. Suppose one takes the causal structure
of a Bell experiment to be given by the following DAG, where
the triangle depicts an unobserved common cause:
A B
X Y
. (190)
This corresponds to the diagrams
X Y
A B
S S′ and
X Y
A B
Λ Λ′ , (191)
in P-I and F-I respectively.
A priori, this assumption about causal structure of the
Bell experiment is the natural one. It is motivated by the
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idea that relativity implies no superluminal causation (not
just a prohibition on superluminal signals). We refer to it as
the common-cause hypothesis [38, 39] regarding the causal
structure. In Section VII B, we will consider alternatives to it.
What about inferential structure? In P-I and F-I these are
X
Y
A B
µA µB
σνA νB
S S′
and X
Y
A B
µ′A µ
′
B
σ′ν′A ν
′
B
Λ
Λ′
,
(192)
respectively, where we have allowed for arbitrary states of
knowledge µA , µB , νA and νB , and σ about the procedures
(respectively µ′A , µ
′
B , ν
′
A and ν
′
B , and σ
′ about the functions),
but we have not allowed for any statistical dependencies
between the identities of these procedures. The factorization
of ν′A and σ
′, for instance, is motivated by the implausibility
of nature conspiring to ensure that the mechanism that sets
the value of the setting variable is related to the mechanism
that fixes the value of the common cause.
We now discuss how the causal-inferential hypotheses
embodied in Eq. (192) constrains the possible observations
that can be made within the classical realist theory, as well
as those that can be made within a given operational theory.
First, we consider the question of what joint distributions
over X ,Y , A and B can be generated in the causal-inferential
structure of Eq. (192) within the classical realist CI theory F-I.
These are given by the diagram
X
Y
A B
µ′A µ
′
B
σ′ν′A ν
′
B
X
Y
A
B
p∗
Λ Λ′
, (193)
where one ranges over arbitrary setsΛ andΛ′ and probability
distributions σ′, µ′A , µ
′
B , ν
′
A , and ν
′
B . We refer to
any distribution that arises in this way as F-I-realizable.
The constraints that pick out the set of F-I-realizable
distributions generally come in the form of both equalities
and inequalities, and we will term these F-I-compatibility
constraints. In particular, inequality constraints will be
termed F-I-compatibility inequalities.
Within our framework, the Bell inequalities (e.g.,
the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holte inequalities for the
case where X ,Y , A and B are binary) are examples of
F-I-compatibility inequalities for the causal-inferential
structure of Eq. (192).
Next, we turn to the question of what joint distributions
over X ,Y , A and B can be generated in the causal-inferential
structure of Eq. (192) within an operational CI theory P-I.
These are given by the diagram
X
Y
A B
µA µB
σνA νB
X
Y
A
B
p
S S′
, (194)
where one ranges over arbitrary systems S and S′ in P-I and
probability distributions σ, µA , µB , νA , and νB . Note that the
set of distributions that can be obtained in this way depends
on the prediction map p of P-I, and so will vary from one
operational CI theory to the next.
We refer to any distribution that can arise in this way
within an operational CI theory P-I as P-I-realizable. The
constraints that pick out the set of P-I-realizable distributions
will be termed P-I-compatibility constraints. In particular,
any inequality constraints will be termed P-I-compatibility
inequalities.
If a classical realist representation as in Theorem VI.2
exists for a given operational theory P-I, it follows that every
distribution that is P-I-realizable is also F-I-realizable. Thus,
for a given operational CI theory P-I to admit of a classical
realist representation, it must be the case that the set of
P-I-realizable distributions for any possible causal-inferential
structure is included in the F-I-realizable distributions for
the same causal-inferential structure.
Consider for example the special case of quantum
theory, considered as the operational CI theory PQ-I
introduced in Section IV A 2. In this case, the well-known
Tsirelson inequalities [40] are examples of PQ-I-compatibility
inequalities for the causal-inferential structure of Eq. (192).
Furthermore, there exist distributions [41] that satisfy the
Tsirelson inequalities but violate the Bell inequalities, and
hence that are PQ-I-compatible but not F-I-compatible with
the causal-inferential structure of Eq. (192). It follows that
the set of PQ-I-realizable distributions is not included in the
set of F-I-realizable distributions, and consequently that PQ-I
does not admit of a classical realist representation.
This is how Bell’s theorem is conceptualized in our
framework.
When Bell’s theorem is conceptualized in this way, it is
found to have counterparts in causal-inferential structures
distinct from that of the Bell Scenario, i.e., Eq. (190). For
instance, recent work has demonstrated that for the triangle
scenario [21–23, 42], whose DAG and associated diagram in
PROC are
X Y
Z
X Y Z
, (195)
there is a gap between what is realizable in a causal model
where some common causes can be quantum and what
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is realizable in a causal model where all common causes
are classical. A similar result has been shown for the
instrumental scenario [24, 43] , whose DAG and associated
diagram in PROC are
Y
Z
X
X
Y
Z
. (196)
These new Bell-like no-go theorems are subsumed in
our framework as proofs of the impossibility of a classical
realist CI representation based on the correlations predicted
by quantum theory for these causal scenarios. The
counterpart within our framework to realizability by a
causal model with quantum common causes [21, 22, 30,
44, 45] is PQ-I-realizability, while the counterpart within
our framework to realizability by a classical causal model
is F-I-realizability. Thus, the counterpart to these no-go
theorems is that for each of these causal structures, one
can find distributions over the observed variables that are
PQ-I-realizable, but not F-I-realizable.
B. The conventional ways out of Bell-like no-go theorems
We now describe the standard responses to Bell-like no-go
theorems, focusing on the specific case of Bell’s theorem
(rather than those based on, e.g., the instrumental or triangle
scenarios).
A common attitude towards Bell’s theorem is that it
demonstrates that realism must be abandoned (at least in
the quantum sphere) and vindicates a strictly operationalist
philosophy of science. We refer the reader to Ref. [46] for a
criticism of this position. We are more interested here in the
realist responses to Bell’s theorem.
For those unwilling to compromise on realism,
the conventional way out is to deny the standard
causal-inferential hypothesis of Eq. (192). Under the
assumption that a radical causal-inferential hypothesis
underpins the correlations observed in a Bell scenario, the
existence of a classical realist representation does not imply
satisfaction of the Bell inequalities, and thus violations
of Bell inequalities no longer imply a challenge to the
possibility of such a representation. We now describe the
two most common positions about the nature of the radical
causal hypotheses.
The hypothesis that a proponent of superluminal
causation endorses. Those who see superluminal13
causation as the way out of Bell’s theorem take the causal
13 Formally describing the distinction between sub- versus superluminality
motivates a minor extension of our framework in which systems come
equipped with spatiotemporal labels. We leave this for future work.
structure of a Bell experiment to be one that allows for
causal influences between the wings, even when these are
space-like separated. As an example, this influence might be
between the setting on the left wing and the outcome of the
right, a causal hypothesis that is depicted by the following
DAG, or equivalently, by the following circuit diagram:
A B
X
Y
X
Y
A
B
. (197)
The hypothesis that a proponent of superdeterminism
endorses. Those who see superdeterminism as the way out
of Bell’s theorem take there to be some statistical dependence
between a setting variable, say X , and the common cause of
the outcomes. This assumption could be encoded in either
the causal or the inferential structure. We here opt to encode
it as the assumption that X and the common cause of the
outcomes are not causally disconnected. This assumption
can depicted by the following DAG, or equivalently, by the
following circuit diagram:
A B
X Y X
Y
A
B
. (198)
At this stage, we would like to head off a possible confusion.
Because it is customary within pre-existing operational
frameworks to use the standard quantum circuit of Eq. (191)
as the diagram representing the Bell experiment, it might
seem that a proponent of a radical causal hypothesis
must be contemplating a realist representation that fails
to be diagram-preserving, and thus it might seem that
our framework, which assumes diagram preservation,
cannot do justice to their view. However, as noted
previously and elaborated on in Appendix B, our framework
stipulates that the diagram representing a given scenario
in the causal subtheory of an operational CI theory is a
representation of one’s hypothesis about the fundamental
causal structure, and hence need not correspond to the
standard quantum circuit (i.e. Eq. (191)). As such,
researchers with different realist worldviews, faced with the
same experimental scenario and observed statistics, might
model these differently within the framework of operational
causal-inferential theories. E.g., the representation of
a Bell scenario within a quantum operational CI theory
will be constrained by the causal structure of Eq. (197)
by a proponent of superluminal causation, but will be
constrained by the causal structure of Eq. (198) by a
proponent of superdeterminism. (Furthermore, the manner
by which such researchers would formalize quantum theory
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as an operational CI theory will not be the straightforward
approach described in Section IV A 2.)
1. Criticisms of the conventional ways out of Bell-like no-go
theorems
We now discuss various reasons why we view these
conventional responses to Bell-like no-go theorems as
unsatisfactory.
The following are grounds for rejecting the
causal-inferential hypothesis of the proponent of
superluminal causation:
• superluminal causal influences are in tension with the
spirit of relativity theory (even if these influences are
constrained in such a way as to be consistent with the
impossibility of superluminal signals)
• superluminal causal influences which are constrained
in such a way as to be consistent with the impossibility
of superluminal signals violate the principle of no
fine-tuning [20].
Meanwhile, the following are grounds for rejecting
the causal-inferential hypothesis of the proponent of
superdeterminism:
• for any of the various mechanisms that could
determine the value of the setting variables (free
choice, a random number generator, a hash of the
day’s stock prices, etcetera), it is implausible that it
would be related to the mechanism which determines
the common cause of the outcome variables insofar
as this would require a kind of conspiracy of causal
determinations
• the fact that any such nontrivial statistical associations
between a setting variable and the common cause
of the outcome variables must be constrained to be
consistent with the observed lack of any statistical
assocation between that setting variable and the
outcome variable at the opposite wing of the
experiment implies violation of the principle of no
fine-tuning [20].
In fact, in Ref. [20] it was shown that every causal
hypothesis that can realize the distributions predicted by
quantum theory (i.e., Bell-inequality-violating distributions)
using a classical causal model (i.e., via F-I) implies a violation
of the principle of no fine-tuning.
We take these arguments to be good grounds for rejecting
the idea of explaining correlations in Bell scenarios via a
radical causal-inferential hypothesis together with a classical
realist representation.
Even if one rejects the principle of no fine-tuning, standard
tools of model selection (which are sensitive not just to
underfitting but overfitting as well) can adjudicate between
various hypotheses regarding the right way to operationally
model the Bell experiment, and these also rule against a
radical causal hypothesis [47].
The no-fine-tuning arguments just given apply equally
well to no-go theorems based on causal structures beyond
Bell scenarios, e.g., the instrumental and triangle scenarios.
That is, one can attempt to resolve the contradiction in each
of these cases by hypothesizing that the causal structure is in
fact distinct from that depicted in Eq. (195) and Eq. (196).
Such resolutions, however, also generally suffer from a
fine-tuning objection insofar as the set of distributions that
are PQ-I-realizable for the original causal structure often
have measure zero within the set of distributions that are
F-I-realizable for the radical causal structure, and they will in
some instances also require superluminal causation.
Insofar as these conventional ways out of Bell’s theorem
require radical causal-inferential assumptions with the
aforementioned undesirable features, the natural question
becomes: does there remain any recourse for achieving a
realist causal-inferential representation of quantum theory
without these unappealing features? In Section IX, we outline
a research program for achieving realism while preserving
the conservative causal-inferential hypothesis, by allowing for
intrinsically nonclassical notions of influence and inference.
Before coming to this, however, we discuss how no-go
theorems based on the principle of noncontextuality appear
within our framework.
VIII. NONCONTEXTUALITY NO-GO THEOREMS
A. Generalized noncontextuality (rehabilitated)
The pre-existing notion of generalized noncontextuality is
framed as a constraint on ontological models of operational
theories and can be summarized as “operationally equivalent
procedures must be represented identically in the ontological
model”. However, our framework has refined the traditional
notions of ontological models and of operational theories,
and the notion of operational equivalence of procedures
has been replaced by inferential equivalence of states of
knowledge about procedures. The notion of generalized
noncontextuality must therefore be refined accordingly.
This rehabilitated notion of generalized noncontextuality
is a principle that constrains a classical realist representation
map, but not the map ξ that we have been focused on so
far. Rather, it is a constraint on a map ζ : P-I→ F˜-I from
the unquotiented operational CI theory P-I to the quotiented
classical realist CI theory F˜-I. The fact that this is a map across
the unquotiented-quotiented divide, means that this specific
sort of classical realist representation is less fundamental
than the map ξ. Nonetheless, it is useful to introduce as a
formal tool, e.g., in order to make connections to existing
literature. Paralleling Definitions VI.1 and VI.3, we define ζ
as follows:
Definition VIII.1. A classical realist representation of an
unquotiented operational CI theory by a quotiented classical
realist CI theory is a diagram-preserving map ζ : P-I→ F˜-I
satisfying (i) the preservation of predictions, namely that the
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diagram
P-I INF
INFF˜-I
ζ
i
p
i˜′
p˜∗
, (199)
commutes, where the double line between the two copies of
INF is an extended equals sign, and (ii) the preservation of
ignorability
ζA
ΛA
=
ΛA
∼p∗
. (200)
Adding the ζ map to the diagram relating P-I, F-I, and their
quotiented counterparts yields
P-I
P˜-I
F-I
F˜-Iξ
ξ˜
∼p
∼p∗
ζ
. (201)
The closest counterpart in our framework to the
pre-existing notion of a generalized-noncontextual
ontological model is that of a generalized-noncontextual
classical realist representation of this sort. This can be
defined in terms of the formal notion of Leibnizianity
introduced in Definition VI.5, but applied to ζ (rather than
ξ):
Definition VIII.2 (Generalized-noncontextual classical
realist representation). The classical realist representation
map ζ : P-I→ F˜-I is generalized-noncontextual if it preserves
inferential equivalence relations.
This can be summarized as “inferentially equivalent states
of knowledge about experimental procedures must be
represented by the same stochastic map.”
We now give an equivalent (process-theoretic)
characterization of a generalized-noncontextual classical
realist representation, in analogy to Proposition VI.6.
Proposition VIII.3. A classical realist representation map
ζ : P-I→ F˜-I is generalized-noncontextual if and only if there
exists a map ξ˜ as defined in Definition VI.3 such that the upper
right triangle in Eq. (201) commutes, implying that the map ζ
can be factored as ξ˜◦ ∼p.
It follows that if there exists a map ξ˜, then there exists a
generalized-noncontextual map ζ (namely ζ= ξ˜◦ ∼p). In fact,
the opposite implication holds as well because the claim
that ζ is generalized-noncontextual means by definition that
there exists a map ξ˜ such that the black triangle in Eq. (201)
commutes. We can therefore summarize the relationship as
follows:
∃ generalized-noncontextual ζ ⇐⇒ ∃ ξ˜. (202)
Note that insofar as a quotiented operational CI theory
subsumes the notion of a GPT, this fact is the rehabilitated
version of Proposition 1 of Ref. [19], which asserts that
an operational theory has a generalized-noncontextual
ontological model if and only if the GPT defined by it has an
ontological model.
To re-emphasize a point made in Ref. [19], a quotiented
operational CI theory is not the sort of thing that can be
either generalized-noncontextual or generalized-contextual
because information about context is precisely what
is eliminated by the quotienting operation. In other
words, it is a category mistake to ask whether ξ˜ is
generalized-noncontextual or not. Thus, for any experiment
that does not support a Bell-like no-go theorem but does
support a noncontextuality no-go theorem, its model
within P-I is always consistent with some classical realist
representation ξ given the representational freedom that
is afforded by context-dependence. Its model within
P˜-I, however, might not admit of any classical realist
representation.
Old proofs of the failure of generalized noncontextuality
will imply proofs of the failure of the rehabilitated version of
generalized noncontextuality, since all that has changed is
how one conceptualizes the mathematics. This is particularly
clear given Eq. (202) and the close connection between the
question of the existence of a ξ˜ map in our framework and
the question of whether a given GPT model of an experiment
admits of an ontological model, which, by Proposition 1 of
Ref. [19], is equivalent to the question of whether a given
operational model of the same experiment admits of a
generalized-noncontextual ontological model.
In previous work, generalized noncontextuality was
defined case-by-case for various types of procedures (e.g.
preparations, measurements, transformations [6], and
instruments [15, 16, 19]), and it was then stipulated that
the natural assumption of generalized noncontextuality is
the universal version of this assumption, meaning for all
types of procedures. In contrast, our process-theoretic
characterization of Leibnizianity (and hence of generalized
noncontextuality) applies to all types of experimental
procedures including more exotic processes such as combs
and circuit fragments with arbitrary causal structure, and
our definition of Leibnizianity is a constraint on all types
of procedures, and therefore is a universal notion from the
get-go.
To end the section, we note that the unscrambling
inherent in our new framework implies a new perspective
on the relationship between Bell-like and noncontextuality
(or Leibnizianity) no-go theorems. Both types of no-go
theorems concern the representability of an operational
CI theory P-I in terms of a classical realist CI theory F-I. A
Bell-like no-go theorem is a demonstration that there does
not exist any classical realist representation map ξ : P-I→ F-I
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as in Definition VI.1. A noncontextuality no-go theorem,
on the other hand, is a demonstration that there does not
exist such a map which is Leibnizian—that is, one wherein
the inferential equivalence relations are preserved, as in
Definition VI.5. Hence we see that Bell-like no-go theorems
are based on a weaker assumption. Nonetheless, in our view,
the stronger assumption of Leibnizianity is just as plausible.
Furthermore, noncontextuality no-go theorems have an
advantage relative to their Bell-like counterparts, namely,
that they can be proven for a broader set of causal-inferential
structures—even those involving just a single causal system.
B. Failures of generalized noncontextuality imply failures of
Leibnizianity
We now discuss the relation between the rehabilitated
notion of generalized noncontextuality and the notion of
Leibnizianity.
While the rehabilitated notion of generalized
noncontextuality is a principle that constrains the
representation map ζ, the notion of Leibnizianity is a
principle that constrains the representation map ξ. It is like
generalized noncontextuality insofar as it can be defined in
terms of the commutation of the diagram, but it cannot be
understood as a notion of independence on context, as we
now explain.
We begin by defining the notion of context that is at play
in the notion of generalized noncontextuality. A context for
some process within a CI theory is the information which
determines which element of an inferential equivalence
class of processes it is—that is, it is information about a
process which is irrelevant for making predictions. Note that
both operational CI theories and classical realist CI theories
have nontrivial contexts: in either case, a full specification
of a state of knowledge over the relevant causal processes
describes both the equivalence class and the context of a
procedure. An explicit example of two states of knowledge
in P-I which are in the same inferential equivalence class
but which differ by context can be found in Eq. (141); an
explicit example of two states of knowledge in F-I which are
in the same inferential equivalence class but which differ
by context can be found in Eq. (162). In this language,
what Leibnizianity demands is that a process’s context can
only determine the context of the representation, not the
inferential equivalence class of the representation. Even
when a given representation ξ satisfies this condition, the
context of a process’s image under ξ can depend on the
context of the process, and hence, it would be inappropriate
to call the map noncontextual. Thus, the inapplicability
of the term ‘noncontextual’ for describing the relevant
constraint on the representation map ξ is seen to be a
consequence of our recognition that the fundamental notion
of a realist CI theory is an unquotiented one, which has
contexts.
In contrast, one can describe the map ζ as
generalized-noncontextual or generalized-contextual,
depending on whether or not the image of a process under
this map is independent of the context of the process.
We turn now to the formal relationships between the two
notions. Combining Eq. (188) and Eq. (202), we infer that
∃ Leibnizian ξ ?⇐==⇒ ∃ gen.-noncontextual ζ ⇐⇒ ∃ ξ˜. (203)
Accordingly, Conjecture (1) can be reformulated as follows:
Conjecture 1′. If an operational CI theory admits of a
generalized-noncontextual classical realist representation as
a quotiented classical realist CI theory, then it admits of a
Leibnizian classical realist representation as an unquotiented
classical realist CI theory. More formally, if there exists a map
ζ : P-I→ F˜-I satisfying Definition VIII.1 and which makes the
upper triangle in the diagram of (201) commute, then there
exists a map ξ : P-I→ F-I satisfying Definition VI.1 and which
makes the square in the diagram of (201) commute.
The existence of a Leibnizian classical realist
representation ξ implies the existence of a
generalized-noncontextual classical realist representation
ζ. Contrapositively, the nonexistence of such a ζ implies
the nonexistence of such a ξ, and therefore every no-go
theorem for generalized-noncontextual classical realist
representations yields a no-go theorem for Leibnizian
classical realist representations.
What about inferences in the other direction? If
Conjecture 1′ is false, then there may be proofs
of the impossibility of a Leibnizian classical realist
representation that are not proofs of the impossibility of a
generalized-noncontextual classical realist representation.
In this case, there may be novel no-go theorems for classical
realist representations of operational quantum theory. By
contrast, if the conjecture is true, then every no-go theorem
based on Leibnizianity yields a no-go theorem based on
generalized noncontextuality.
In addition to being motivated by Leibniz’s principle,
there are a number of other deep motivations for taking
generalized noncontextuality as one’s notion of classicality.
Admitting of a generalized-noncontextual classical
realist representation subsumes several other notions
of classical explainability, such as admitting of a positive
quasiprobability representation [19, 48, 49], admitting of
a locally causal model [41, 50], and being embeddable
in a simplicial GPT [34, 51]. Additionally, operational
theories that fail to admit of a generalized-noncontextual
classical realist representation provide advantages for
information processing relative to their classically
explainable counterparts [18, 52–60]. In light of the
relationships proven above between Leibnizianity and
generalised noncontextuality, each of these can be
repurposed as a motivation for taking F-I-Leibnizianity as a
good notion of classicality for an operational CI theory.
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C. The conventional way out of noncontextuality no-go
theorems
What is the conventional response to the lack of the
existence of a generalized-noncontextual classical realist
representation ζ of quantum theory, considered as the
operational CI theory PQ-I? (Or equivalently, to the lack of the
existence of a classical realist representation ξ˜ of quantum
theory, considered as the quotiented operational CI theoryPQ-I?) For those who are unwilling to compromise on their
notion of a realist representation, the typical response is to
endorse a failure of generalized noncontextuality.
Endorsing such a failure requires a renouncement of
Leibnizianity. Thus, to anyone who is unwilling to
compromise on Leibniz’s principle, this ‘way out’ of the
no-go results will be unappealing.
There is, however, the possibility of an alternative
to the conventional response, one that aims to salvage
Leibnizianity within a realist representation. The idea is
the one already noted at the end of Section VII B 1, namely,
to underlie operational quantum theory with a realist
causal-inferential theory wherein the causal and inferential
components are intrinsically nonclassical. The next sections
take up this research program.
IX. BEYOND CLASSICAL REALISM
In the conclusions of the last two sections, we criticized
the conventional ways out of Bell-like and noncontextuality
no-go theorems on the grounds that the price they must
pay to salvage the standard notion of realism—violating
the principle of no-superluminal causation, violating the
principle of no fine-tuning, and abandoning the Leibnizian
methodological principle—is too high. We also noted that
this motivates a new type of research program, wherein
one seeks to salvage these principles by considering
novel notions of realist representations wherein the causal
and inferential components thereof become intrinsically
nonclassical. The hope is that a realist causal-inferential
theory of this type will have enough in common with its
classical counterpart such that a representation in terms
of it can nonetheless be judged to provide satisfactory
explanations of the operational phenomena. (In previous
work, this idea has been described as ‘achieving realism
while going beyond the standard ontological models
framework’ [61].) Up until now, the constraints that such
a representation must satisfy have been articulated only
vaguely, if at all. The framework of causal-inferential theories
allows us to say much more about the nature of such a
representation and hence about how to further this research
program.
We begin by considering the question of what properties a
causal-inferential theory must have in order to be considered
realist, that is, such that representability in terms of such a
theory can be considered to provide a realist explanation of
operational facts.
A. Constraints a causal-inferential theory must satisfy to be
considered realist
Suppose that a nonclassical analogue of FUNC is denoted
XFUNC and a nonclassical analogue of INF is denoted XINF
and that the nonclassical realist causal-inferential theory
defined by the interaction of these is denoted XF-XI. We
have:
XINFXF-XIXFUNC
e′ i′
p∗
, (204)
where the maps e′, i′ and p∗ play the same roles that they do
in F-I.
Given that we have distinguished the notions of
operational and realist causal-inferential theories under the
umbrella of causal-inferential theories, it is clear that (in our
view) a generic causal-inferential theory—in particular an
operational CI theory—does not contain enough structure to
be deemed worthy of the title ‘realist’. While an operational
CI theory can predict observations, it does not itself provide
a realist explanation of those predictions. Thus, we do not
consider P-I to be an instance of XF-XI. In this section, we
highlight the additional structure possessed by a classical
realist CI theory F-I over and above that possessed by an
operational CI theory P-I, since this structure represents
some, if not all, of the properties one should demand of
a causal-inferential theory XFUNC in order that it be deemed
‘realist’.
Because P-I and F-I are built out of the same inferential
subtheory, INF, the contrast between them reduces to the
contrast between the causal subtheories out of which they
are built, FUNC and PROC respectively, and to differences in
how these interact with INF.
In FUNC, actual causal structure is encoded in the
identities of the functions. For example, if a process
corresponds to a function that is independent of its
argument, then there is no causal connection between the
input and the output of that process. In other words, the
function associated to some process specifies the causal
structure internal to the process. This is why, for example,
for the identity and swap functions, where the internal
causal structure can be viewed simply as a wiring, one can
replace the process (depicted as a gate in the circuit) with
the associated wiring, as in the discussion around Eq. (6).
In PROC, on the other hand, the internal structure of a
process is not specified. A given process does not necessarily
even have a causal influence from its inputs to its outputs—it
is only that there is potential for such a causal influence.
Some information about the internal causal structure may be
inferred from the image of this process under the prediction
map, but this does not generally provide a full specification
of the internal causal structure of the processes (e.g., we
saw in Section V A that inferentially equivalent processes can
correspond to different causal structures).
To summarize, PROC encodes potential causal influences,
while FUNC encodes actual causal influences. What we have
termed a causal theory is meant as an umbrella for these two
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notions.14
Formally, the issue is that the interpretation of processes in
a process theory is derived primarily from their interactions
with other processes—through the nontrivial equalities that
involve them. But PROC is a free process theory, with no
nontrivial equalities; hence, processes in PROC have an
interpretation that is impoverished relative to those in FUNC.
Thus a first criterion for a CI theory to be deemed realist is
the following:
• The causal subtheory of the CI theory must have
enough nontrivial equalities such that its processes
represent actual causal influences rather than
potential causal influences.
The exact formalization of this remains to be determined, but
we give constraints on its formalization later in this section.
A minimal requirement is that XFUNC is not a free process
theory.
We now turn to a comparison of the interaction between
PROC and INF and the interaction between FUNC and INF.
FUNC and INF interact in a very constrained way. Firstly,
one can define propositions about (or equivalently, directly
gain information about) any causal system in F-I, since the
generator in Eq. (123) is defined for all systems in a classical
realist CI theory.
In contrast, the interaction between PROC and INF is very
limited, insofar as one cannot define propositions about
(or directly learn information about) any systems which are
nonclassical.
A commitment to realism means that the systems can
mediate causal influences, and that one can consider
different propositions about any given system, and that
one can understand every valid inference as a consequence
of knowledge propagation through these causal mediaries.
In particular, if it is the existence of a causal pathway
between two variables that accounts for the inferences
that can be made between these, then it must be possible
to understand these inferences as decomposable into a
sequence of inferences, stepping through systems along
the causal pathway. For example, in a Bell scenario (as in
diagram (194)), updating one’s knowledge of the outcome at
the left wing, A (which depends on background knowledge
about X ), leads to an updating of one’s knowledge of
the outcome on the right wing, B (which depends on
background knowledge about Y ), via the mediary of systems
S and S′. Specifically, updating one’s knowledge of A leads to
an updating of one’s knowledge of S, which in turn leads to
14 It is worth noting that the assumption of diagram-preservation for the
classical realist representation ξ ensures the preservation of the structure
of potential causal influences, not that of actual causal influences. That
is, if there is no potential causal influence between a pair of systems in
some given diagram of PROC, then the image of this diagram under ξ
must be such that there is no actual causal influence between these in
FUNC. If, however, there is a potential causal influence between a pair of
systems in some given diagram of PROC, then there may or may not be in
its representation in FUNC.
an updating of one’s knowledge of S′, which in turn leads to
an updating of one’s knowledge of B . The ability of systems
to encode information and to be mediaries in a sequence of
refinements of knowledge is key, we argue, for a given theory
to be described as realist.
These ideas lead to our next two criteria for a CI theory to
be deemed realist. Firstly:
• Propositions must be able to attach to all systems in
the CI theory.
Formally, this fact about F-I has important consequences.
Chiefly, it implies that in F-I, one can introduce the equality
in Eq. (127), which allows the translation of a proposition
about the output of a causal mechanism into a proposition
about its input and the identity of the mechanism. We elevate
this to a criterion of its own:
• It should be possible to propagate knowledge claims
through any causal mechanism. Formally, there must
exist an analogue of Eq. (127).
By contrast, there is no equality analogous to Eq. (127) in
operational CI theories. Specifying states of knowledge about
the causal processes in an operational CI theory does not
yield statistical predictions until one specifies a prediction
map. Indeed, nearly all of the non-generic features of
an operational CI theory are buried within the choice of
prediction map.15
This rewrite rule leads to a great deal of the structure of F-I
and ultimately to the uniqueness of the prediction map, as in
Theorem IV.3. It seems an essential part of any fundamental
theory of nature that the predictions one makes should
be uniquely determined by a complete causal-inferential
description of one’s scenario within that fundamental theory.
Hence, another criterion for a CI theory to be deemed
realist:
• The CI theory must have a unique prediction map.
In a nonclassical realist CI theory, the systems need not
be classical variables (i.e., they need not be associated with
sets) and the states of knowledge of these systems need
not be associated with probability distributions over these
sets. Such possibilities are what open up space for evading
Bell-like and noncontextuality no-go theorems. Nonetheless,
it is likely that XFUNC will need to include classical variables
as an allowed type of system and functions between these
as an allowed type of causal process, e.g., in order to
describe the setting and outcome variables associated with
experimental procedures. Similarly, XINF likely needs to
include the classical INF as a subtheory, so that it can make
the correct statistical predictions for diagrams consisting
entirely of such classical variables.
15 Note that if an operational CI theory P-I does admit of a classical realist
representation in terms of F-I, then this representation serves to provide
an explanation for the prediction map of P-I in terms of the unique
prediction map of F-I and the representation map ξ.
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In summary, an important part of the research program
is to find mathematical structures XFUNC and XINF that
respect all of the desiderata required for a CI theory to be
deemed realist.
An analogy with non-Euclidean geometry— Here, some
readers might wonder how one could possibly speak of logical
propositions concerning a system S, states of knowledge
about S, and manners in which S is causally determined
by other systems, if S is not represented by a set, if causal
determination is not represented by a function from one set
to another, if propositions are not represented by subsets, or
if states of knowledge are not represented by distributions
over the set. To explain the idea, we make an analogy to
geometry.
The idea is that a putative nonclassical realist
causal-inferential theory XF-XI will stand to the classical
realist causal-inferential theory F-I as a nonEuclidean
geometry stands to Euclidean geometry.16 Just as the
meanings of the terms ‘point’ and ‘line’ in a nonEuclidean
geometry are determined from the axioms of that geometry
rather than corresponding to the common-sense notions,
so too will the meaning of various causal and inferential
concepts within a given nonclassical realist causal-inferential
theory XF-XI be determined by the specific axioms of that
process theory (i.e., the diagrammatic rewrite rules) rather
than corresponding to the conventional ones. In this
sense, we are embracing the attitude towards mathematical
structure that is characteristic of category theory and that
contrasts with the attitude of set theory wherein everything
is built up from concepts concerning sets. The fact that
systems in a nonclassical realist causal-inferential theory
are not associated with sets does not imply, therefore, that
such systems cannot be the locus of causal influences or the
subject of propositions and states of knowledge. Note that
the attitude towards scientific realism that such a research
program presumes is cognate with the philosophical
position of structural realism [63].
Additional constraints on a realist theory— In addition
to the constraints outlined above, other plausible candidates
for such constraints come from the features one judges to be
essential to any notion of causation or notion of inference.
They are the analogue of constraints on nonEuclidean
geometries that arise from what one takes to be essential
to the notions of ‘point’ and ‘line’. They are constraints on
the process theory which, if violated, might well lead one
to question whether the theory really is describing causal
influences and inferences after all. Note that there is no way
to be certain about the appropriateness of such constraints
a priori, because prior to some concrete modification of
the classical theory having been proposed and shown to
be coherent and useful, it is difficult to know which of the
features of the classical theory are essential.17
16 Hilary Putnam famously used this analogy to describe how a quantum
logic ought to be conceptualized relative to classical logic [62]. We are
simply extending the analogy to describe how probabilistic inference and
causal influence ought to be conceptualized as well.
17 This caveat also holds for the constraints described earlier in this section:
Nonetheless, some examples illustrate the sorts of
constraints that are likely to be justified by the essential
nature of causation and inference.
Some constraints on a process theory which we believe to
be essential for it to describe causal influences are as follows.
For a pair of processes f and g , where the output of f is
type-matched with the input of g , if either one of f or g is
such that it has no causal connection between its input and
its output (however this is formalized), then the process g ◦ f
must also have no causal connection between its input and
its output. Similarly, for an arbitrary pair of processes f and
g , if both have no causal connection between their input and
their output, then this is also the case for the process f ⊗ g .
One also expects any putative nonclassical theory
of causation to contain analogues of most, if not all,
of the standard notions that arise in the framework
of classical causal models: common causes, causal
mediaries, d-separation, evaluation of counterfactuals,
etcetera. Preliminary work towards establishing how the
evaluation of counterfactuals is formally achieved within F-I
is provided in Section X B.
An example of a constraint on a process theory that we
take to be essential for the processes to describe inferences
is as follows. Suppose three systems, S1, S2 and S3 are such
that the composite S1⊗S2 is inferentially independent of S3,
in that no updating of one’s knowledge about one leads to
any updating of one’s knowledge about the other (however
knowledge updating is formalized). In this case, each of the
component systems S1 and S2 is individually inferentially
independent of S3.
One also expects that any putative nonclassical theory
of inference should contain analogues of most, if not all,
of the standard notions that arise in Boolean logic and
Bayesian probability theory: logical connectives, implication,
conditional independence, sufficient statistics, etcetera. 18
One can also imagine that there are constraints on the
interaction between processes in the causal and inferential
theories that are essential to the nature of causation and
inference. For instance, it seems plausible that for any set of
classical variables (regardless of what sorts of nonclassical
variables mediate influences between them) the existence
of a d-separation relation [5] among them in the causal
structure should be sufficient to infer that they satisfy the
appropriate conditional independence relation [44].
one or more of them might in fact need to be violated in a nonclassical
theory of inference.
18 A comment is in order regarding the extent to which F-I satisfies this
desiderata. Although all of the standard notions are present in preexisting
frameworks for Boolean logic and Bayesian probability theory, F-I is a new
framework for formalizing both of these in a single theory, and for certain
inferential notions, e.g., post-selection and Bayesian inversion, it is still
not clear how best fo formalize these within F-I (or whether, perhaps, (i)
F-I needs to be modified in order to do so, or (ii) these notions are in
fact dispensible without compromising the usefulness of the theory of
inference). This is a topic for future work.
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B. Nonclassical realist representations
Having described what it means for a causal inferential
theory to embody a satisfactory notion of realism, we
can now describe the notion of a nonclassical realist
representation: namely, a representation of an operational
CI theory in terms of a nonclassical realist CI theory. The
definition is the analogue of Definition VI.1, but where the
image of the map is a nonclassical realist CI theory rather
than a classical one. This definition (given below) is the
sense in which we have now formalized the idea of ‘achieving
realism while going beyond the standard ontological models
framework’.
For an arbitrary operational CI theory P-I, we can seek to
find a nonclassical realist CI theory XF-XI in terms of which
P-I can be represented. That is, we can ask if there is a realist
representation map ξ : P-I→ XF-XI which can be defined in
an analogous way to Def. VI.1.
Note, however, that whereas the inferential subtheories of
F-I and of P-I were identical (namely, INF), the inferential
subtheory of XF-XI is allowed to be something more
general than that of P-I, namely, what we have denoted
XINF. Consequently, one needs to modify the condition
of preservation of empirical predictions (the commutation
of Eq. (176)). Rather than the two inferential subtheories
being equal, they will be related by some sort of map
φ : INF→ XINF whose defining properties is a subject for
future work. Given a satisfactory definition of φ, one can
define:
Definition IX.1. A nonclassical realist representation of
an operational CI theory is a diagram-preserving map
ξ : P-I→ XF-XI into a nonclassical realist CI theory XF-XI
satisfying (i) the preservation of predictions, namely that
the diagram
P-I INF
XINFXF-XI
ξ
i
p
i′
p′
φ . (205)
commutes, and (ii) the preservation of ignorability
ξA
ξA
=
ξA
. (206)
Analogously, one can also extend the notion of a classical
realist representation for an arbitrary quotiented operational
CI theory P˜-I to that of a nonclassical realist representation
in terms of a theory XF-XI. Again, the only non-trivial aspect
of this generalization is in defining the map φ : INF→ XINF .
One can summarize the notions of nonclassical realist
representations via the analogue of Eq. 189:
P-I INF
P˜-I
XINFXF-XI
XF-XI
ξ
ξ˜
PROC
XFUNC
e i
p
e′ i′
p′
∼pe˜ i˜ p˜
i˜′ p˜∗∼p∗e˜
′
φ . (207)
C. A new way out of Bell-like no-go theorems
Recall that a Bell-like no-go theorem arises whenever one
finds a causal structure in which the set of P-I-realizable
probability distributions is not contained in the set of
F-I-realizable probability distributions—that is, those that
can be generated by a classical realist representation.
The possibility of nonclassical realist representations
provide a novel way out of such no-go theorems. Rather
than asking if the observed experimental statistics are
F-I-realizable, one can instead ask if they are XF-XI-realizable,
that is, representable using a map ξ : P-I→ XF-XI into some
nonclassical realist CI theory XF-XI.
If this can be done, it seems appropriate to claim that
such a realist representation has salvaged locality. More
precisely, such a representation has provided a means of
being conservative with respect to causal structure—i.e. no
superluminal influences—by being radical with respect to
the nature of the realist CI theory.
We have not yet provided such a realist CI theory
XF-XI which can reproduce the quantum predictions while
providing a satisfactory realist explanation of them. However,
our work in formalizing the notion of a nonclassical realist
theory, e.g. via the formal criteria given in Section IX A,
constitutes a first concrete step in this direction.
D. A new way out of noncontextuality no-go theorems
A nonclassical realist CI theory XF-XI necessarily includes
a notion of inferential equivalence—one simply evaluates
equivalences relative to the prediction map in XF-XI. It
follows that one can define Leibnizianity for nonclassical
realist representations much as it was defined for classical
realist representations (in Section VI C):
Definition IX.2 (Leibnizianity of a nonclassical realist
representation). A nonclassical realist representation map
ξ : P-I→ XF-XI is said to be Leibnizian if it preserves
inferential equivalence relations.
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Consequently, it makes just as much sense to ask whether
a given operational CI theory admits of a nonclassical realist
representation that is Leibnizian as it did to ask that question
of a classical realist representation. This is a key benefit of
our new process-theoretic definition of Leibnizianity.
As in the case of classical realist representations, we can
give an equivalent characterization in terms of a commuting
square. A nonclassical realist representation map ξ : P-I →
XF-XI is Leibnizian if and only if there exists a map ξ˜ : P˜-I→XF-XI such that the following diagram commutes:
P-I
P˜-I
XF-XI
XF-XIξ
ξ˜
∼p
∼p′
. (208)
Consequently, the relation of Eq. (188) goes through for
nonclassical realist representations.
One can extend the notion of
generalized-noncontextuality to nonclassical realist
representations in a similar fashion. Specifically, the map
ζ : P-I →XF-XI is defined to be generalized-noncontextual
if the triangle in upper right of the following diagram
commutes:
P-I
P˜-I
XF-XI
XF-XIξ
ξ˜
∼p
∼p′
ζ
. (209)
Again, the fact that the definitions are all process-theoretic
implies that we have
∃ Leibnizian ξ ?⇐==⇒ ∃ gen.-noncontextual ζ ⇐⇒ ∃ ξ˜. (210)
for nonclassical realist representations, just as we had
Eq. (203) for their classical counterparts.
The possibility of nonclassical realist representations
therefore holds the potential for a novel way out of
noncontextuality no-go theorems, a way out that does not
compromise on the Leibnizian methodological principle.
X. DISCUSSION
A. Finding a satisfactory ontology and epistemology for
quantum theory
Now that the idea of a nonclassical realist CI theories has
been explained, we can turn to the quantum variety of such
a theory. Recall that a strong motivation for identifying
such a theory was provided in Sections VII B 1 and VIII C,
namely, that of finding a more satisfactory way out of
Bell-like and noncontextuality no-go theorems. We can
now articulate more precisely the criteria of success for this
research program. Success constitutes finding a notion of a
quantum realist CI theory constituting the following triple of
process theories and maps between these:
QINFQF-QIQFUNC e
′ i′
p∗
, (211)
which satisfies the constraints articulated in Section IX A.
(Here, the ‘Q’ in the notation refers to the fact that we are
aiming specifically for a quantum generalization of FUNC,
INF, and F-I.) Furthermore, success in the research program
requires QF-QI to bear a specific relation to operational
quantum theory when the latter is conceptualized as PQ-I,
described in Section IV A 2, and having the structure
PQ-I INFPROCQ
e i
pQ
, (212)
which is the counterpart, within our framework, of the
standard manner of formalizing operational quantum
theory.
First, there must be a nonclassical realist representation
map ξ : PQ-I → QF-QI of the sort defined in Definition IX.1.
For this to be the case, it must be that for any given
causal-inferential scenario, the set of QF-QI-realizable
distributions must include the PQ-I-realizable distributions.
If this can be achieved, then one obtains a way out of
Bell-like no-go theorems which is more satisfactory than
the conventional ways out insofar as it need not involve
any superluminal influences (thereby salvaging the spirit
of locality), and insofar as it need not avail itself of any
fine-tuning of parameters.
Second, the realist representation map ξ : PQ-I → QF-QI
must be Leibnizian in the formal sense of Definition IX.2.
One thereby achieves a way out of the noncontextuality
no-go theorems that is more satisfactory than the
conventional way out insofar as it salvages the Leibnizian
methodological principle (and thereby the spirit of
generalized noncontextuality).
The key question for this research program, therefore, is
whether one can identify a nonclassical realist CI theory
QF-QI that satisfies the constraints articulated in Section IX A
and also provides a Leibnizian representation of PQ-I.
Although there has been some work on interpreting
some of the formalism of quantum theory as a nonclassical
generalization of Bayesian inference, the kind of classical
theory that served as the target of this generalization was an
ontological model. As noted in Section V B 2, the notion of
an ontological model corresponds to a quotiented classical
realist CI theory. And, as argued in Section V C, such a
theory involves a partial scrambling of causal and inferential
concepts. This is problematic because it is likely that the
constraints on putative quantum generalizations of classical
theories are only clear if causal and inferential notions are
cleanly separated in the latter, and hence only if these
quantum generalizations are pursued at the level of the
unquotiented theory.
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As an example, consider how the project of finding
a nonclassical generalization of Bayesian inference was
pursued in Ref. [64], which built upon ideas proposed
in Refs. [65, 66]. The focus was on finding intrinsically
quantum counterparts to the notions of joint, marginal and
conditional probability distributions, as well as counterparts
to the relations that hold between these, such as the
counterpart of marginalization, the law of total probability,
and the formula for Bayesian inversion. A conditional
probability distribution, of course, is equivalent to a
stochastic map, which represents an inferential equivalence
class of states of knowledge about functional dynamics, and
often involves a partial scrambling of causal and inferential
concepts (as illustrated in Section V C). The fact that the
focus of this earlier work was on a mathematical object
that scrambled causal and inferential concepts may explain
why there are outstanding problems with the approach,
such as those described in Ref. [64] and in Ref. [67]. A
state of knowledge about functional dynamics—unlike the
inferential equivalence class of such objects—involves no
such scrambling. It is consequently this object that is more
appropriate to focus on and for which to seek an intrinsically
quantum counterpart.
It is possible that the proposals for quantum
generalizations of propositional logic which were pursued
under the banner of ‘quantum logic’ [68, 69] also suffer
from having mistaken inferential equivalence for identity.
Certainly, we believe that conventional approaches, such
as the one that takes the counterpart of a Boolean lattice
to be an orthomodular lattice, are unlikely to yield success
in the research program described here. This is because
such approaches are informed solely by the structure of
projectors on Hilbert space and this may well merely be
describing aspects of the quotiented quantum realist CI
theory, while it is only the unquotiented theory QF-QI that
one can hope to decompose into a causal subtheory QFUNC
and an inferential subtheory QINF (where the structure
concerning propositional logic lives).
We now highlight some prior work that is likely to be useful
in developing an intrinsically quantum notion of a realist CI
theory.
On the causal side, recent work on developing an
intrinsically quantum notion of a causal model [30, 45, 70]
is likely to provide a good starting point for finding the
correct quantum generalization of FUNC. In particular, the
notion of decomposing a unitary gate into a more refined
circuit that includes ‘dots’ (isomorphisms wherein a Hilbert
space is decomposed into a direct sum of tensor products),
introduced in Ref. [30] and studied in depth in Ref. [31], is
likely to be incorporated in some way into QFUNC.
In pursuing the correct quantum generalization of INF,
recent work developing a synthetic approach to probability
theory (formalized as ‘Markov categories’) [71–74] is likely
to be useful. This is because if the BAYES subtheory of INF
can be characterized more abstractly, the possibilities for
quantum generalization should become more evident. In
particular, the work of Ref. [75], which is in the same spirit as
Refs. [71, 73], may provide an important piece of the puzzle
(in spite of not having the benefit of a proper unscrambling
of causal and inferential notions). Specifically, the logical
broadcasting map described therein may be the counterpart
in QINF of the copy operation in INF.
Similar comments may well apply to prior work in the
field of quantum logic, namely, that in spite of suffering
from some causal-inferential scrambling, specific insights
from that research program could prove useful in finding
the counterpart within QINF to various notions within the
subtheory BOOLE of INF.
To close, we note that there has been a great deal of
interest in whether certain mathematical objects in the
quantum formalism—most notably quantum states—have
an ontological or an epistemological status [66, 76–84].
Although disentangling ontology and epistemology is
certainly critical to the project of unscrambling Jaynes’
omelette, it is worth noting that in some cases this question
presumes a false dichotomy. To see this, note that even in
a classical realist CI theory, certain mathematical objects
play multiple roles—for example, functions appearing in
FUNC describe the causal inflluence that one variable
has on another, while the same functions in INF (now
represented as deterministic stochastic maps) describe
how learning about one variable leads to updating one’s
knowledge of another. It seems likely, therefore, that certain
mathematical objects in a quantum realist CI theory will
also have counterparts in both the causal and inferential
subtheories. Indeed, a single-system unitary is likely to be
such an object, describing the nature of a causal influence
in the causal subtheory and the nature of how one updates
one’s knowledge in the inferential subtheory. The question
about whether a given mathematical object in the quantum
formalism has an ontological or epistemological status,
therefore, must sometimes be refined to take into account
the context in which the mathematical object appears.
B. Subsuming the framework of classical causal modeling
We have considered two distinct classes of causal theories,
namely, PROC and FUNC. The primary technical distinction
between these two is that FUNC has equalities, while PROC
does not. We have seen various consequences of this extra
structure on FUNC, e.g., the uniqueness of the probability
rule in F-I. Conceptually, the primitive type of process in
PROC (a list of lab instructions) constitutes an extremely
minimal description of the causal mechanism relating its
inputs to its outputs. Meanwhile, the primitive type of
process in FUNC (a functional dependence) constitutes a
much more informative description.
In fact, causal dependences in a classical theory can be
defined in terms of functional dependence of one variable
on another. This is done, for instance, in structural equation
models [5], and it is the notion of (classical) causality that
we endorse here. Hence, one might expect that structural
equation models could be subsumed in our framework
within F-I, which allows for both a description of the
functional (hence causal) dependences among variables, as
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well as a specification of one’s knowledge about exogenous
variables. Similarly, the notion of a probabilistic causal
model (or ‘causal Bayesian network’) [5], wherein the
functional dependences and the states of knowledge of the
exogenous variables are not specified individually, but are
folded together into a conditional probability distribution,
is likely to be subsumed in our framework within the
quotiented theory F˜-I. In future work, we hope to explore the
relationship between our framework and various notions of
classical causal models, and to argue that in some regards,
our framework is more general than the standard one.
To reproduce all of the purposes to which classical causal
models are put (in particular, considering the consequences
of interventions and evaluating counterfactuals), it will
be useful to introduce a distinct type of causal theory of
functional dynamics, embedded within FUNC, which we
will term PREFUNC. The systems and processes in PREFUNC
are the same as in FUNC, but the process theory is defined
without equalities. In particular, the composition of two
functions f (·) and g (·) in sequence in PREFUNC is not strictly
equal to the function f (g (·)). One can then define a DP
map from PREFUNC to FUNC which induces an equivalence
relation on PREFUNC, namely, two diagrams in PREFUNC
are equivalent if they define the same function when the
component functions in the diagram are composed.
Remark X.1. The transition from FUNC to PREFUNC can
be viewed as an example of a very general construction on
process theories. First, one defines a forgetful functor from
the category PROCESSTHEORY to a new category (which we
will call PROCESSSET) where a particular process theory is
mapped to its underlying set of processes thereby forgetting
the compositional structure of the process theory. We can
then define a free functor which is left adjoint to the forgetful
functor. The composition of these two functors then defines a
comonad on PROCTHEORY which, in particular, takes FUNC
to PREFUNC. This is closely related to [85, Ex. 4.2.2].
To better understand the differences between PREFUNC
and FUNC, consider the following three diagrams, where the
gate represents a classical controlled NOT operation:
a)
A1 A2
B1 B2
D1
C2
D2
C1
b)
A1 A2
D1 D2
c)
I
A1 A2
B1 B2
D1
C2
D2
. (213)
In FUNC, the process described by diagram (a) and
that described by diagram (b) are strictly equal. The two
diagrams are merely distinct manners of specifying the
overall input-output functionality of the effective function
from A1 and A2 to D1 and D2. In PREFUNC, however,
diagrams represent ‘histories’ of processes, rather than
merely representing input-output functionalities. These two
diagrams viewed within PREFUNC are therefore not equal to
one another, but rather are merely equivalent in the sense
defined just above.
Despite the fact that (a) and (b) are equal within FUNC, it
is clear that the interventions possible on each of them are
distinct. To formally describe all possible interventions in a
given scenario, it is essential that one works within PREFUNC,
wherein (a) and (b) are merely equivalent; e.g., this allows
one to consider the interventionI shown schematically in
(c).
In order to provide a fully formal diagrammatic treatment
of the interventional aspects of the framework of classical
causal models [5], it will likely be useful to take the causal
theory to be PREFUNC rather than FUNC. We will address
this project more explicitly in future work.
Insofar as our work reveals that stochastic matrices
(equivalently, conditional probability distributions) relating
a cause to its effect generically scramble together causal
and inferential concepts, this is true even for the notion
of a do-conditional, which is defined as the conditional
probability distribution of an effect variable given a cause
variable when the value of the cause is intervened upon,
rather than being determined by its natural causal parents.
From the perspective of our work, the only object which does
not lose any information about what is known about the
causal influence of one variable on another is the probability
distribution over the function that relates the one variable
to the other, while the do-conditional merely describes an
inferential equivalence class of such objects. This and related
ideas will also be explored in future work.
C. More future directions
There are many natural extensions of our work, and many
ways in which it is likely to shed light on other research
programs. We now discuss some of these research directions,
beyond those highlighted in the discussion sections or
introduced throughout the paper.
We first note a straightforward supplementation to the
notion of an operational CI theory. Recall that an operational
CI theory shares the inferential subtheory in common with
the classical realist CI theory, but the causal subtheory
PROC is distinct from FUNC. Nonetheless, because there
is a distinction within PROC between classical systems (the
settings and outcomes of procedures) and general systems,
one can imagine a supplementation of PROC wherein the
classical systems and all processes thereon have all of the
structure of FUNC. Although the inferential consequences
of this structure can in principle be obtained by encoding
it in the prediction map, the framework is more useful if
the additional equalities are present within PROC itself. This
supplementation is likely to be particularly useful for the
study of computational complexity in general operational
theories [86–90].
It should also be straightforward to formulate our
framework using the language of category theory;
category-theoretic tools might then provide guidance
on which extensions of our framework are most easily
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formalized next, and might provide technical tools (e.g.
for going beyond the finiteness assumptions that we have
made). Making connections to the string diagrammatic
representation of double-categories [91] may be a useful
first step.
The process-theoretic formulation of a CI theory makes
it easy to incorporate extra structure into the systems. Of
particular interest would be to equip systems with the
action of particular groups in order to be able to represent
symmetries explicitly in our formalism. This is essential for
an understanding of unspeakable information [92, 93] and
for leveraging this to prove new no-go theorems and find
new types of nonclassicality. Tools from Refs. [94, 95] provide
a useful starting point for this project.
Additionally, it would be useful to complete the project
begun in Section X B, namely, that of determining how
various results in the framework of classical causal models [5]
can be recast using the formalism of classical realist
causal-inferential theories, and to explore to what extent
the additional causal-inferential unscrambling that our
framework provides may be beneficial to the field of causal
inference. It will also be interesting to consider how the
notion of an operational CI theories compares to the notion
of a causal model with latent systems that can be quantum
or GPT [21, 44, 96] and whether our framework offers some
advantages relative to these.
At present, our framework describes only the reasoning
of a single agent. It would be interesting to incorporate
the reasoning of multiple agents. This project will
require integrating insights such as pooling of states of
knowledge [97, 98]. Relatedly, it would be interesting to
consider what insight our framework can add to puzzles
regarding the fact that agents can be considered themselves
as physical systems. Such puzzles include the scenario of
Wigner’s friend [99] and variants thereof [100]. On a related
note, it would be interesting to study how the available causal
mechanisms in a CI theory determine the precise manner
in which any agent, considered as a physical system, can
gather information about its environment—and hence, what
sort of theory of inference is most adaptive for it. One might
expect that such considerations will constrain the interplay
between the causal and inferential subtheories of any realist
CI theory.
One could also seek to attack the problem of
reconstructing quantum theory from novel axioms using
our framework as an alternative to existing frameworks for
reconstructing quantum theory [8, 10, 12, 101–111]. This
would be particularly interesting if one could reconstruct
quantum theory as a realist CI theory rather than a generic
operational CI theory. Our framework may also may
provide new insights into axioms that single out quantum
correlations [112–117] (based, e.g., on the criteria of
Section X A).
One can naturally define postquantumness [118–125] of
correlations in our framework. For a given causal structure,
any distribution that is P-I-realizable by an operational
theory P-I, but which is not PQ-I-realizable, is said to
be postquantum. Our framework also allows for new
ways of studying postquantumness; e.g., if one were to
develop a notion of a quantum realist causal-inferential
theory, then, for a given operational CI theory, one could
seek to determine which experimental scenarios manifest
postquantumness in the sense of failing to admit of a
quantum realist representation or failing to admit of a
Leibnizian quantum realist representation.
Epistemically restricted classical statistical theories, such
as those described in Refs [61, 80], are perhaps best
understood within our framework as operational CI theories
that admit of a Leibnizian classical realist representation.
In this sense, if the world were governed by such a theory,
there would be no problem to providing satisfactory realist
explanations of observations, and one would have no need
to consider any departure from the classical notion of
realism F-I. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to try and
cast such theories as examples of nonclassical realist CI
theories themselves, that is, as defining a triple (XFUNC,
XINF, XF-XI) that differs from the classical triple (FUNC, INF,
F-I). Ideally this would be done such that the epistemic
restriction emerges as a consequence of the underlying
reality, as opposed to being simply a built-in constraint.
Even though such theories are classical insofar as they
also admit a Leibnizian classical realist representation, this
project might nonetheless constitute a useful warm-up for
the project of characterizing QF-QI. On the one hand, by
exploring other realist CI theories we will gain insight into
how the causal and inferential subtheories constrain one
another, and, on the other hand, there are many formal
similarities between epistemically restricted theories and
quantum theory (indeed, they often constitute subtheories
of quantum theory).
We also discussed in Section VI C how, if Conjecture 1
is false then there are no-go theorems for Leibnizian
classical realist representations of operational quantum
theory beyond the no-go theorems based on generalized
noncontextuality. It is therefore important to settle the
question of the status of Conjecture 1.
We have presented a partial development of a graphical
calculus for Boolean propositional logic. We leave for
future work the problems of developing this into a complete
graphical calculus, extending it to incorporate predicate
logic, and generalizing it to nonclassical logics. Similarly,
there are additional tools from Bayesian probability theory
which would be useful to incorporate into INF such as
postselection and Bayesian inversion. Both of these projects
are likely to help with the eventual development of QINF.
Another research direction concerns the development of a
resource theory [126] of nonclassicality. We have here argued
that the distinction between classical and nonclassical is
best understood as a distinction concerning the sort of
realism required to provide an explanation of operational
predictions. Within any proposal for a nonclassical realist
CI theory XF-XI which subsumes the classical realist CI
theory F-I, therefore, one can hope to formulate a resource
theory of nonclassicality of processes. In this way, the
research program described here could clarify the notion
of nonclassicality inherent in ‘common-cause boxes’ (i.e.,
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Bell scenarios), studied in Refs. [38, 127, 128], and the
nonclassicality inherent in contextuality scenarios (i.e.,
scenarios that imply a noncontextuality no-go theorem, but
not a Bell-like no-go theorem).
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Appendix A: Related work
A number of previous works either inspired parts of our
work, or would be interesting to relate to our work.
The basic diagrammatic notation underpinning this work
can be traced back to the work of, for example, [129, 130],
which used string diagrams to represent particular types of
categories. See [131] for a clear survey of these notations,
and see [132] for a graphical representation of tensors.
The two-directional diagrams which we used here were
inspired by Hardy’s duotensor notation [10]. A seemingly
related notation has also appeared in the context of double
categories [91], and it would be interesting to see if there is a
formal connection between these. The work of [133] (which
was itself based on [134]) first introduced us to the graphical
representation of diagram-preserving maps which we used
in this work.
Diagrammatic notation was first used in the context of
quantum theory within the research program of categorical
quantum mechanics, which began in [135], was axiomatised
in [136], and is now the basis of the textbook [137]. This
sparked the quantum picturalism revolution [138, 139],
as well as use of similar notation for GPTs [10] and the
operational probabilistic theories of the Pavia group [7, 103,
140]. Stronger connections between these notations have
been developed in, for example, [12, 26, 141]. Moreover,
more categorical approaches to generalized theories have
been studied extensively using diagrammatic notation, in
particular by Gogioso in Refs. [11, 26, 125], which also
contains a formal treatment of the infinite dimensional
case [142, 143].
There are many connections to the framework of
operational probabilistic theories [7, 103, 140], which
served as inspiration for multiple aspects of our framework.
Developing a full understanding of the relations between the
two is left for future work. Of particular note is the idea of a
prediction map being used to define a notion of equivalence,
with respect to which one can quotient. This notion of
quotienting also appeared in [10] and [19]. Moreover, the
causality axiom of Ref. [7] is closely related to our ignorability
assumption, and both of these are closely related to the
notion of terminality of Refs. [144, 145].
Moreover, the rough idea of structure preservation in
ontological models has appeared in various forms (e.g. as
a diagram-preserving map, or equivalently as a functor
between categories) in Refs. [19, 146–150].
Appendix B: On the meaning of diagrams in our operational CI
theories
In Section VI A, we noted that diagram preservation is an
immediate consequence of our choice to take diagrams in
an operational CI theory to represent one’s hypothesis about
the fundamental causal and inferential structure in the given
scenario. We now contrast this with the usual approach to
operational theories, wherein one typically takes operational
diagrams to be a representation of some kind of structure
that is independent of one’s interpretation.
For example, in quantum theory, any given scenario can be
described as a circuit of completely-positive trace-preserving
maps. The circuit assigned to a particular experiment (or to
the idealized conception thereof) is essentially unique, and
is a fact on which physicists of virtually all interpretational
camps will agree upon. At a minimum, these camps agree on
this circuit as the ‘correct’ one in the sense of having maximal
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pragmatic utility as a mathematical representation of one’s
experiment. In the usual approach to operational theories,
it is this circuit depicting the calculational structure that is
typically taken as the diagram representing one’s scenario.
To provide a realist representation of one’s scenario,
however, requires one to furthermore commit to an
underlying causal structure. In general (depending on
one’s interpretational camp), this causal structure will not
correspond to the calculational circuit just described. Hence,
in such an approach, one’s realist representation map would
not be diagram-preserving, but must somehow map from the
calculational circuit to one’s hypothesized causal structure.
In contrast, in our framework, we do not represent
the calculational circuit at all. Rather, we stipulate that
the diagram one draws to describe a given scenario in
an operational CI theory must be chosen to respect
one’s hypothesis about the fundamental causal-inferential
structure. Hence, the classical realist representation map is
diagram-preserving.
The only real novelty here is that in our framework, the
term ‘operational theory’ no longer describes a description
which is so bare-bones that all users of the framework will
agree on it.
We now note a key consequence of our choice to take
operational diagrams to represent one’s hypothesis about
the fundamental causal-inferential structure: namely, that
diagram-preservation does not constitute a limitation on the
scope of realist representations within our framework.
To demonstrate this, consider the classical realist
representation of a pair of independent causal systems
in our framework. Diagram preservation implies that
these are represented by a pair of independent systems in
the classical realist CI theory. Since system composition
in a classical realist CI theory is given by the cartesian
product of the corresponding ontic state spaces, it appears
as though our framework commits one to represent every
pair of operational systems by a cartesian product of the
corresponding state spaces, an assumption sometimes
termed ontic separability [81]. If one is committed to the idea
that the two systems in question fundamentally exhibit some
holistic properties, then this assumption (and hence our
assumption of diagram preservation) might appear overly
restrictive. Such an impression is mistaken, however. In
our framework, to posit such holistic properties is to grant
that the actual causal situation is one in which the relevant
degrees of freedom fundamentally cannot be divided into
two independent subsystems—even if they are represented
by a tensor product in the calculational diagram. Rather, they
fundamentally behave as a single monolithic causal system.
With this causal hypothesis, then, our framework demands
that one represent the operational scenario using a single
system rather than a pair of systems, and the classical realist
representation of this single system is thereby allowed to be
an arbitrary ontic state space, not necessarily a Cartesian
product of ontic state spaces of two components. So we
see that our framework does not limit the scope of classical
realist representations.
Of course, given a commitment to a particular
causal-inferential hypothesis, the assumption of
diagram-preservation provides strong constraints on
the scope of possible classical realist representations.
These constraints take the form of causal compatibility
constraints, as discussed in Section VII A. Indeed, one
can subsume a number of assumptions made in deriving
no-go theorems on ontological representations (including
those needed to derive Bell’s theorem, a version of the
preparation-independence postulate [82], the Markovianity
assumption used in Ref. [151], lambda-screening [152], and
the assumptions used in Ref. [19]) under the assumption
that the fundamental causal-inferential structure respects
the standard (calculational) quantum circuit.
Appendix C: Useful results in INF
We now list a number of useful equalities, some of which
we will need for proofs in the next section. Each can be
verified immediately by composing the partial functions
defining the relevant processes.
>X B = >X BY , ⊥X B = >X BN .
(C1)
>X = >BpiX , ⊥X = ⊥BpiX
(C2)
∨ = = ∧ (C3)
f
f
= f (C4)
∨
N
B
B
B
= B , ∨
Y
B
B
B
= > Y BB (C5)
∧
Y
B
B
B
= B , ∧
N
B
B
B
= > N BB (C6)
∧
B
B
Y =
B
B
Y
Y
, ∨
B
B
N =
B
B
N
N
(C7)
∧
¬
¬
= ∨ ¬ , ∨
¬
¬
= ∧ ¬
(C8)
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>
X
X
X
= X
X
X
= X (C9)
⊥
X
X
X
= 0X X (C10)
∧
∨
=
>
; (C11)
= (C12)
∨
∧
= ∧
∨
∨
, (C13)
∧
∨
= ∨
∧
∧
, (C14)
1. Properties of a Boolean algebra (proved diagrammatically)
A Boolean algebra satisfies the following properties (which
are not all independent). For simplicity, we will here use α,
β, and γ to denote propositions.
• associativity: α∨ (β∨γ)= (α∨β)∨γ and α∧ (β∧γ)=
(α∧β)∧γ
• commutativity: α∨β=β∨α and α∧β=β∧α
• identity: α∨⊥=α and α∧>=α
• complements: α∨¬α=> and α∧¬α=⊥
• distributivity: α∨(β∧γ)= (α∨β)∧(α∨γ) and α∧(β∨
γ)= (α∧β)∨ (α∧γ)
• idempotence: α∨α=α and α∧α=α
• annihilation: α∨>=> and α∧⊥=⊥
• absorption: α∨ (α∧β)=α and α∧ (α∨β)=α.
We now prove that each of these expressions holds in our
diagrammatic representations. We prove only the first of
each of these expressions; in each case, the proof of the
second is similar. The associativity and commutativity axiom
follow immediately by the symmetry of Eq. (37). The identity
axiom follows simply from
α
⊥
∨X
X
X
B
B
B
=
α
N
∨X
X
B
B
>
= αX B .
(C15)
To prove the complements axiom, one has
α
¬α
∨X
X
X
B
B
B
=
α
α
∨X
X
B
B
¬
(C16)
= ∨ B
B
¬α B
BX (C17)
= α BX B> (C18)
= X > B (C19)
The proof of distributivity is as follows:
α
β
γ
∧
∨ =
α
β
γ
∧
∨
∨
(C20)
=
α
β
∧
∨
∨
γ
γ
(C21)
=
α
β
∧
∨
∨
γ
γ
(C22)
=
α
β
∧
∨
∨
γ
γ
(C23)
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where Eq. (C22) follows from Eq. (C12) and Eq. (C20) follows
from Eq. (C13).
The proof of idempotence is as follows:
α
α
∧ = α ∧ = α (C24)
The proof of annihilation is as follows:
α
>
∨ =
α
∨
> Y
(C25)
= > Y = > . (C26)
The proof of absorption is as follows:
α
β
α
∧
∨ =
∧
β
α
α
∨ (C27)
=
α ∨
∧
β
(C28)
=
α
>β
(C29)
= α , (C30)
where Eq. (C29) follows from Eq. (C11).
2. Partial functions in BOOLE
Recall from Eq. (53) that any partial function fˆ can be
written as
fˆ =
χ fˆ
Y
F
X , (C31)
where χ fˆ specifies the domain of fˆ and F is a propositional
map.
Consider now the action of fˆ on an arbitrary propositional
effect defined by pi ∈B(Y ), namely
pi
Y
fˆ
X =: fˆ (pi)X . (C32)
This defines a map fromB(Y ) toB(X ), but it remains to see
what structure of the Boolean algebra of propositional effects
this map preserves. We now show that the action of partial
functions on propositional effects preserves⊥, ∨ and ∧, but
not> and ¬.
First, note that we can reexpress fˆ (pi) in terms of the
propositional effect χ fˆ ∈B(X ) and the total function F as
follows:
pi
Y
fˆ
X =
χ fˆ
Y
F pi
X (C33)
=
χ fˆ
Y
F pi
X
Y
Y
B
B
(C34)
=
χ fˆ
F (pi)
X
Y
Y
B
B
(C35)
=
χ fˆ
F (pi)
X ∧ YB (C36)
= χ fˆ ∧F (pi)
X
Y
B (C37)
= X χ fˆ ∧F (pi) . (C38)
This is a very natural expression, stating that fˆ (pi) is
equivalent to a propositional effect defined by the subset
of X which is both in the domain of fˆ and in the image of pi
under F .
At this point it is easy to verify that⊥ is preserved:
⊥YfˆX = X χ f ∧F (⊥) (C39)
= X χ fˆ ∧⊥ (C40)
= X ⊥ , (C41)
but that> is not preserved if χ f ( X :
>YfˆX = X χ fˆ ∧F (>) (C42)
= X χ fˆ ∧> (C43)
= X χ fˆ . (C44)
Hence, fˆ does not define a Boolean algebra homomorphism
(as these preserve>).
However, it does preserve ∨ and ∧, as we now show.
Preservation of ∨ can be derived as
X
fˆ (pi∨pi′) = pi
F
pi′
X ∨ YBY
χ fˆ
X
X
(C45)
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= F (pi)
F (pi′)
X ∨ YB
χ fˆ
X
X
(C46)
= F (pi)
F (pi′)
X ∧ YB
χ fˆ
X
X B
Y
(C47)
= F (pi)
F (pi′)
X ∨
χ fˆ
X
X
∧ B Y
(C48)
= F (pi)
F (pi′)
X
χ fˆ
X
X
Y∨
∧
∧
(C49)
=
F (pi)
F (pi′)
X
X
Y∨
∧
∧
χ fˆ
χ fˆ
X
(C50)
=
χ fˆ
X
X
Y∨
∧
∧
F (pi)
χ fˆ
X
F (pi′)
(C51)
= X (χ fˆ ∧F (pi))∨ (χ fˆ ∧F (pi′)) (C52)
= X fˆ (pi)∨ fˆ (pi′) , (C53)
where Eq. (C49) follows from Eq. (C14) and Eq. (C51) follows
from Eq. (C12). Preservation of ∧ can be derived as
X
fˆ (pi∧pi′) = pi
F
pi′
X ∧ YBY
χ fˆ
X
X
(C54)
= F (pi)
F (pi′)
X ∧
χ fˆ
X
X
∧ B Y
(C55)
=
F (pi)
F (pi′)
X
∧
X ∧ B Y
∧
χ fˆ
X
χ fˆ
(C56)
=
F (pi′)
χ fˆ
X
∧
X ∧ B Y
∧
χ fˆ
X
F (pi)
(C57)
= X (χ fˆ ∧F (pi))∧ (χ fˆ ∧F (pi′)) (C58)
= X fˆ (pi)∧ fˆ (pi′) , (C59)
where Eq. (C56) follows from Eq. (C20) and Eq. (C57) follows
from Eq. (C12).
In summary, we see that fˆ is a Boolean algebra
homomorphism fromB(Y ) toB(χ fˆ ).
3. Propositions about composite systems
In Eq. (38), we noted that one can express propositional
questions about composite systems, e.g. as
X
B
Y
pi (C60)
where pi ∈B(X ×Y ). However, suppose that we have some
propositional question pi about X and some propositional
question pi′ about Y ; then, how should these be composed to
give a propositional question about X ×Y ? One’s first guess
might be to simply compose these in parallel within BOOLE;
however, this would give
BY
pi′
B
pi
X
, (C61)
which is not a propositional question as its a function to B×B
rather than simply B. The resolution comes from examining
how we expect these to compose as Boolean Algebras. Note
that the sets compose via the cartesian product, hence
Boolean Algebras compose via the following rule: B(X )⊗
B(Y ) :=B(X ×Y ) and moreover that pi⊗pi′ ∈B(X )⊗B(Y )
can be defined as a subset of X×Y bypi×pi′ viewed as subsets
of X and Y respectively. In our diagrammatic language this
is represented by:
X
B
Y pi⊗pi′ = BY
pi′
B
pi
X
∧ B (C62)
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This composite therefore can be clearly interpreted as the
situation in which we are interested in both pi and pi′ being
true about their respective systems.
Note, however, that we then clearly have other ways that
we could compose these, for instance via:
BY
pi′
B
pi
X
∨ B (C63)
to see what this means in terms of the Boolean Algebra
consider the following rewrites:
BY
pi′
B
pi
X
∨ B =
Y
pi′
pi
X
∨ B
>X
>Y
∧
∧
(C64)
=
Y
>X ⊗pi′Y
piX ⊗>Y
X
∨ B (C65)
=
Y
(>X ⊗pi′Y )∨ (piX ⊗>Y )
X
B
(C66)
(Here we have included or omitted subscripts labeling
the systems about which propositions are being made, as
convenient.)
This corresponds, intuitively, to what we would mean for
the logical disjunction of two propositions about distinct
systems.
4. Useful relations between stochastic maps
There are various relationships between the stochastic
maps which we have defined which are useful in the proofs
in this paper. We list them here for reference.
Λ ?Λ Λ = Λ (C67)
Λ?Λ ?Λ = ?Λ (C68)
Y
X
X ×Y
Y
X
=
Y
X
(C69)
Y
X
X ×YX ×Y = X ×Y (C70)
Λ′
Λ
?Λ×Λ′ =
Λ′
Λ
Λ×Λ′ ?Λ×Λ′ . (C71)
Λ′Λ
ΛΛ′
= Λ′
?Λ
ΛΛ′
?Λ′
Λ
. (C72)
Appendix D: Useful results in FI
1. A useful lemma about (sub)stochastic maps
We now state and prove a lemma which was needed to
justify Eq. (F6).
Lemma D.1.
σ =
σ′
⇐⇒
σ =
σ′
where σ is an arbitrary substochastic map. This result and
proof also hold if one replaces all of the equalities with
inferential equivalences.
Proof. The ⇐ direction trivially follows from Eq. (88). To
prove the⇒ direction, we begin by assuming that
σ =
σ′
(D1)
Composing this with a state preparation generator and the
star isomorphism gives
σ =
σ′
(D2)
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which can be rewritten using Eq. (132) to
σ =
σ′
(D3)
and then, using Eq. (177) and Eq. (C9), to
σ =
σ′
(D4)
Finally, we use (on the LHS) the fact that the star is an
isomorphism and (on the RHS) the fact that the star is
stochastic to obtain the result:
σ =
σ′
. (D5)
The proof proceeds in the same way if one replaces all
equalities with inferential equivalences. If one assumes
Eq. (D1) but with the equality replaced by inferential
equivalence, then Eq. (D2) follows by the fact that inferential
equivalence is preserved by composition. The remainder of
the proof then follows by the same rewrite rules.
2. Copy function and complete common causes
First, let us define the copy function in FUNC, denoted
Λ
Λ Λ
, (D6)
by •(λ)= (λ,λ) for all λ ∈Λ.
We now show how some useful properties of the copy
functioncan be lifted to define a corresponding process in
F-I, via
e′
. (D7)
Specifically, that this acts as a suitable copy operation for F-I,
that is, it is symmetric
e′
=
e′
=
e′
(D8)
and associative,
e′
e′
=
e′
=
e′
=
e′
e′
, (D9)
as follows immediately from diagram preservation of e′ and
the associativity of the underlying function. By Eq. (96), the
embedding of the unique function u to the trivial system ?
is equal to the ignoring map:
e′
u = [u] = [u] = , (D10)
one can also see that it is a counit for the copy:
e′
=
e′
e′
u
=
e′
u
= =
e′
u
=
e′
e′
u
=
e′
.
(D11)
We now show that processes of the form
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
(D12)
describe situations in which Λ is the complete common
cause [30] of Λ′ and Λ′′. This is a consequence of the fact
that the outputs of a process in FUNC are (by construction)
deterministic functions of the inputs, and hence in this
diagram, Λ is the only possible cause of Λ′ and Λ′′. (To
represent a scenario in which the two have more than one
common cause, one would represent these explicitly as
inputs to the process. Note that our framework does not
incorporate a diagrammatic distinction between latent and
observed variables, although introducing such a distinction
might be useful in future work.)
Lemma D.2.
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
=
e′
Λ
Λ′
Λ
Λ′′
Λ
(D13)
where the black triangle is a stochastic map defined by
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linearity and
ΛΛ′×Λ′′ ΛΛ′
ΛΛ′′
::
 F
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
 7→
 F
u
⊗
 F
u

(D14)
where u is the unique function to ?.
Proof. First, note that we have a similar decomposition in
FUNC, that is for all functions F there exist fl and fr such
that
F
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
=
fl fr
(D15)
where
fl = F
u
and fr = F
u
. (D16)
We will now show that this result can be lifted to F-I. Note that
the definition of the black-triangle stochastic map, together
with the above choices for fr and fl , imply that
[F ] =
[ fr ]
[ fl ]
. (D17)
Now consider the following set of rewrites, where [•] is the
state of certain knowledge that the copy operation, • :Λ→
Λ×Λ, of Eq. (D6) has occurred.
e′
Λ
Λ′
Λ
Λ′′
Λ
=
Λ′Λ′′
Λ
e′
(D18)
=
Λ′Λ′′
Λ
[•]
(D19)
=
Λ′Λ′′
Λ
[•]
. (D20)
Next, note that
[•]
= , (D21)
as can be verified by computing its action on an arbitrary
delta function state of knowledge [F ], namely
 F
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
 7→
 F
u
⊗
 F
u
 (D22)
7→
 F
u
F
u
 (D23)
7→
 fl fr
 . (D24)
Hence, by Eq. (D15), we see that
[•]
::
 F
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
 7→
 F
Λ
Λ′ Λ′′
 , (D25)
justifying Eq. (D21). The conjunction of Eq. (D21) and
Eq. (D20) immediately establishes the lemma.
Next, we show that learning about an ontological system
is the same as first copying that system and then learning
about the copy:
Λ
Λ
Λ =
e′
Λ
Λ
Λ
Λ
. (D26)
Proof. We start with the RHS and will rewrite it into the LHS.
In the following equalities, Eq. (D29) follows from Eq. (127),
Eq. (D30) follows from the fact that [•] is a point distribution,
Eq. (D32) follows from Eq. (C9), and Eq. (D33) follows from
Eq. (D10).
e′
Λ
Λ
Λ
Λ
= [•]
Λ
Λ
Λ
Λ
(D27)
= [•] (D28)
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=
[•]
(D29)
= [•] [•] (D30)
= [•] (D31)
= [•] (D32)
=
e′
u
e′
(D33)
=
e′
u
(D34)
= e′ (D35)
= (D36)
3. Other equalities
A special case of Eq. (127) is
Λ?Λ =
Λ
?Λ (D37)
since
Λ
?Λ = (D38)
= (D39)
= Λ?Λ . (D40)
First, we show that one can always find at least one
possible causal explanation in FI for any inference. A simple
example of this is
=
Λ
?ΛΛ ; (D41)
here, the inference described by the identity function is seen
to have a possible causal explanation as the statement that a
causal system has not evolved. As another simple example,
inferences described by functions can always arise from a
causal system evolving under that function as its dynamics,
e.g. as
f = f
e′
Λ′
?ΛΛ
. (D42)
Most generally, an inference described by a general
substochastic map can always be viewed as having partial
knowledge about the input to some functional causal
dynamics and considering a proposition about part of the
output of the dynamics. That is, an arbitrary process S ∈ INF
satisfies
S
Λ Λ′ =
σ
f
pi
(D43)
=
σ
f
pi
e′
(D44)
where σ is a probability distribution, f is a function, and pi is
a propositional effect.
Proof. The proof is as follows, where Eq. (D51) follows from
Eq. (C71) and Eq. (D52) follows from Eq. (C72) (and the
remaining equalities follow from the rewrite rules in F-I that
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we have introduced):
σ
f
pi
e′
=
σ
[ f ]
pi
(D45)
= [ f ] pi
σ
(D46)
= [ f ] pi
σ
(D47)
=
[ f ]
σ
pi
(D48)
=
[ f ]
σ
pi
(D49)
=
[ f ]
σ
pi
(D50)
=
[ f ]
σ
pi
(D51)
=
[ f ]
σ
pi
(D52)
= f
σ
pi
(D53)
=
σ
f
pi
(D54)
Next, we show that one can always replace what we know
about a transformation with what we know about a variable
that controls the transformation. First let us describe a
“universal control” function ∈ FUNC, as follows:
∀ f ∈ ΛΛ′
f
Λ
Λ′
ΛΛ′ = f
Λ
Λ′
(D55)
where the black diamond represents the universal control
transformation , and where we have introduced a causal
system which ranges over the (finite) set of functions from Λ
to Λ′. Then, one can show
=
e′ (D56)
Proof. One can rewrite the RHS into the LHS, as follows:
e′ =
[ ]
(D57)
= [ ]
[1]
(D58)
=
[ ]
[1]
(D59)
= (D60)
(D61)
where the last step follows from the fact that
[ ]
[1]
= (D62)
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as can be verified by computing its action on an arbitrary
delta function state of knowledge [ f ]. Namely,
 f
Λ
Λ′
 7→

f
ΛΛ′  (D63)
7→
[
f
Λ
]
(D64)
7→

f
Λ
Λ′
 (D65)
=
 f
Λ
Λ′
 , (D66)
where the final equality is given by Eq. (D56).
4. Proof of normal form for F-I
We now prove Theorem IV.2; namely, the normal form
S
i′
(D67)
for F-I, where S is a substochastic map.
Proof. We will prove this by induction. First, we show (Step i) that every generator can be written into normal form. Second,
we prove (Step ii) that the composite of two normal form diagrams can be rewritten into normal form. Given these, it is clear
that one can write any diagram into normal form by first rewriting all of the generators involved into normal form using Step i,
composing these according to Step ii, and iterating until the entire diagram is in normal form.
Step i—The fact that each generator is in normal form can be seen by inspection. For example, stochastic maps are
generators in our theory, and are already in normal form—namely, the special case that arises when one takes all the causal
systems in the normal form to be trivial. The other three generators (describing interactions between the causal and inferential
systems) can be written in normal form as follows:
=
i′
[u] , ΛΛ′
Λ
Λ′
=
i′
and
Λ
Λ
Λ =
i′
[1] .
(D68)
Step ii—First, we write down the most general way to compose two diagrams and then expand each of these in terms of the
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conjectured normal form:
D1
D2
. =
S1
S2
. (D69)
Removing the dashed gray lines and simply moving the wires around gives
=
S1
S2
(D70)
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Next, we use Eq. (88) and Eq. (78) to add in extra processes to obtain
=
S1
S2
[1]
[1]
(D71)
Merging some of these together, one obtains
=
S1
S2
[1]
[1]
(D72)
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Next, simply moving wires around yields
=
S1
S2
[1]
[1]
, (D73)
at which point one can identify the two gray dashed boxes as stochastic maps (since these contain only normalized inferential
processes). Denoting these S′1 and S
′
2 one obtains
=:
S′1
S′2
, (D74)
We can use Eq. (127) to rewrite this as
=
S′1
S′2
= S′1
S′2
. (D75)
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Rewriting to express compositional structure within one’s inferences, one gets
= S′1
S′2
=:
S
(D76)
where one has identified the process in the dashed box as a stochastic map S. Noting then that each pair of wires can be
considered as a single composite wire and that S is in the image of i′, this is indeed seen to be in the claimed normal form.
Appendix E: Useful results in F˜-I
1. Statement and Proof of Lemma E.1
We now state and prove a lemma used in the main text.
Lemma E.1. A causal identity is inferentially equivalent to a
process which factors through an inferential system as
∼p∗ . (E1)
Proof. By Lemma V.2, we can establish the inferential
equivalence by showing the following:
∀τ
τ
p∗
=
τ
p∗
(E2)
Now, as follows from Section I A, these testers are shorthand
notation for a diagram of the form:
τ
=
xτ
yτ
(E3)
By applying the normal form of Theorem IV.2 to the special
case of processes of the form of xτ and of the form of yτ, we
can write this tester explicitly as
sτ
eτ
i′
i′ , (E4)
and hence our goal is to prove the following equality:
sτ
eτ
i′
i′
p∗
=
sτ
eτ
i′
i′
p∗
(E5)
This equality follows immediately from the following set of
rewrites (where the first and last equality follow from the
special case of Lemma D.2 where Λ is trivial):
= (E6)
= (E7)
= (E8)
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= (E9)
= (E10)
2. Proof of Lemma V.9
We now prove Lemma V.9, that two processes in F˜-I are
inferentially equivalent if and only if they are associated with
the same substochastic map.
Proof. The =⇒ direction follows immediately from the
definition of inferential equivalence and the fact that the
following diagram is a tester:
. (E11)
To prove the ⇐ direction, one can apply the fact that p∗ =
p˜∗◦ ∼p∗ and then apply Lemma E.1 to show that
D
p∗
T
= D
p˜∗
∼p∗
∼p∗
T
(E12)
= D
p˜∗
∼p∗
p˜∗
T
(E13)
= D
p∗
T
(E14)
and similarly for E .
Now, starting with the RHS of the implication in Eq. (164),
D
p∗
= E
p∗
, (E15)
we will derive the LHS using the result we just proved. First,
note that this equality implies that
∀T D
p∗
T
p∗
= E
p∗
T
p∗
.
(E16)
Diagram preservation then allows us to write this as:
∀T D
p∗
T
= E
p∗
T
(E17)
Now, consider a special class of testers, namely, those of the
form:
T
=
T ′
(E18)
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for anyT ′. Condition E17 therefore implies that
∀T ′ D
p∗
T ′
= E
p∗
T ′
.
(E19)
Using Eq. (E14), this is equivalent to
∀T ′ D
p∗
T ′
= E
p∗
T ′
(E20)
But this is just the definition of inferential equivalence:
D ∼p∗ E (E21)
3. Proof of Theorem V.11
We now prove Theorem V.11, which immediately led to the
normal form for F˜-I given in Corollary V.12. In the equalities
that follow, Eq. (E23) follows from Eq. (D44), Eq. (E24) follows
from Eq. (D26) and Eq. (D56), Eq. (E25) follows from two
applications of Eq. (E1), Eq. (E31) follows from Eq. (127),
Eq. (E32) follows from Lemma (D.2).
Proof.
S =
f
σ
pi
(E22)
=
f
σ
pi
e′
(E23)
=
f
σ
pi
e′
e′
e′
(E24)
∼p∗
f
σ
pi
e′
(E25)
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=
σ
pi
[D] (E26)
where
D = f (E27)
We can then further rewrite this as:
= σ
pi
[D]
[1]
(E28)
=
Π′
Σ′ (E29)
= Π′Σ′
>
(E30)
=
Π′
>
Σ′
(E31)
=
Π′
>
Σ′
e′ (E32)
=
Π′
>
Σ′
e′ (E33)
=
Π′
>
Σ′
(E34)
= Σ
Π
(E35)
By their construction, one can see that Σ is a stochastic map
and Π is a propositional map.
Appendix F: Useful results for classical realist representations
1. Proof of Theorem VI.2
We now prove Theorem VI.2.
Proof. First, note that Eq. (177), diagram preservation of ξ,
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and the constraint of ignorability, Eq. (95), imply that
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
=
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛA
(F1)
=
ΛA
. (F2)
Now, Theorem V.11 gives that
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
∼p∗ Σ
Π
ΛB
ΛA
AB
, (F3)
for some substochastic map Σ and some propositional effect
Π. Applying this to decompose the process on the LHS of
Eq. (F1), one gets
Σ
Π
∼p∗ . (F4)
Rewriting the LHS of this we obtain
Σ
Π
∼p∗ (F5)
Using Lemma D.1 (stated and proved in Appendix D 1), we
obtain
Π ∼p∗
χΠ
>
(F6)
Substituting this in, we obtain
Σ
χΠ
>
∼p∗ (F7)
and so
Σ
χΠ ∼p∗ . (F8)
Hence, it must be that
Σ
χΠ =: ΞBA (F9)
is a stochastic map.
Finally, substituting the decomposition of Π into Eq. (F3)
and then using the definition of ΞBA , one obtains
ξ
ABAB B
A
ΛB
ΛA
∼p∗ Σ χpi
>
(F10)
= ΞBA (F11)
That is, every classical realist representation is inferentially
equivalent to updating one’s knowledge about the
operational procedure to knowledge about functional
dynamics.
